Israel attacked Iran to stop the salami tactics. Now Tehran and Moscow will choose to raise the stakes or to bargain. The uncertainty about China.
Israel attacked Tehran’s Ayatollahs to stop the salami tactics of an unwinnable proxy war with Hamas in Gaza, Lebanon’s Hezbollah, and the Yemenite Houthis, while Iran was completing its nuclear program.
The war in Gaza is unwinnable in traditional terms because Hamas pushes its people to death to shame Israel in the court of public opinion, accusing it of “genocide,” while still holding Israeli hostages. Thus, Hamas wages two wars: one that blackmails Israel by forcing the killing of Palestinians, and another in the West by inciting anti-Israel sentiment and antisemitism, highlighting killings that Hamas de facto perpetrates.
It’s unwinnable because you can’t stop Hamas from killing its people while Iran, abroad, protects Hamas leadership. The goal is to corner and isolate Israel, waiting for Iran to have a fully deployable nuclear asset to threaten the region.
A reasonable outcome of the Israeli attack could be a retaliatory exchange followed by talks on Gaza, with Iran pushing Hamas to surrender.
Yet, there are unfathomable elements in the present situation, namely. It’s unclear what Russia will push or suggest Iran do.
Suppose Israel settles in Gaza. All attention will shift to Ukraine; thus, there will be increased pressure on Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Iran lost a lot in the Israeli raids, but could lose much more in a broader escalation. The presence of civilian authorities shields the Ayatollahs’ power. The duality allows the civilian authority to take the blame, enabling the Ayatollahs to retreat. Therefore, they can bargain.
Unless they fear the blow is too hard and the regime could be toppled. Still, the US’s recent pledge against regime changes and its ongoing dialogue with Tehran could provide some guarantees to the religious leaders.
However, if the conflict in Gaza stops, Ukraine becomes the global frontline, and Russia’s position becomes more exposed.
In theory, now is when Putin is still not cornered and could seek a ceasefire before his chances diminish. Alternatively, Putin could raise the stakes, gamble further, open a new front, and destabilize another country. Just days ago, there were concerns that Russian forces in Libya threatened to hit Italy with rockets.
In any case, the wide conflict that started three years ago with the invasion of Ukraine is at a turning point.
Then there is the elephant in the room: nobody knows what China will do. At the start of the wars in Ukraine and Gaza, China supported Russia and Hamas, hoping to divert attention from its friction with the US.
However, the two wars didn’t deliver on their promises (break Ukraine and Israel): quite the opposite. There are now ongoing trade talks with America, and the two sides seem close to some deal. Additionally, in recent weeks, a new Chinese ambassador in Tel Aviv has been working to improve relations with Israel.
If China supports Iran now, these efforts could be jeopardized. In theory, a course of action could be encouraging a peaceful resolution and negotiations while refraining from taking sides, waiting for Iran and Russia to play their cards.
Beijing could be under diplomatic pressure from Iran and Russia to take sides. If China steps back, Iran would be weaker. Yet, if Beijing keeps its distance from the conflict, how much good it would create in Washington or Asia is unclear. Whatever China decides to do, it will have much broader implications.
