The US avoided a quagmire in the Gulf, but the peace agreement is not ideal. America needs a long-term plan for the region, and China
The issue of the peace agreement between the United States and Iran is full of traps and snares. It has pitfalls that could create problems in the region for America and its allies, including Israel and the Gulf countries, for years.
However, unlike in Iraq over 20 years ago and unlike Vietnam over 60 years ago, it avoided the major danger. It wasn’t caught in a quagmire that would drain forces and resources for years over a minor global issue, when America is actually dealing with broader, more serious problems.
The greatest fault of the war is that it was ill-conceived in the first place, especially given the timing and the lack of a clear-cut objective. It shouldn’t have been started shortly before a meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping. This created short-circuits between the Gulf and China that should have been carefully avoided. If an attack had to take place, it should have occurred after the meeting and been short and clear.
The reason is simple: with a war, you know when you start it, but you don’t know when you finish, what it will involve, or how it will develop. To start an attack against Iran in such a narrow window of time would be, as it is and as it was, a problem. You don’t control the timing, and therefore, you don’t control the developments and the narrative.
The second problem was the objective. If you want regime change, you need to prepare well in advance inside the country, and, if absolutely necessary, an attack from outside should be surgical and short.
In any case, an attack against Iran could not be indefinite. It should be surgical, like the one conducted a year ago. The United States could have attacked Iran and killed the top leader, Ali Khamenei, but after a few hours or days, it could have stopped the attack by declaring victory unilaterally, and that would have been it.
Iran had not yet blocked the Strait of Hormuz, and if it had done so right after a couple of days of the attack, the global narrative would have been different.
Different governments, different wars
An authoritarian regime can control the stock exchange and ignore people’s complaints about rising inflation. The drawback is that, without a free stock market and free public opinion, it can’t proactively mobilize its capital and population.
A democratic system can achieve that mobilization, but it is vulnerable to shifts in markets and public opinion. When Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz, triggering inflation, it sparked panic among the US and global publics. Public opinion rightly wondered what the end of the war would be, when it would come, and how to manage its money to prepare for long-term consequences. In response to all of this, the US president had no clear answers. Then, rather than throwing good money after bad, he pulled back and cut his losses.
Now it’s a new day. It’s not as bad as it could have been, but it’s certainly not good either. Iran is not strong, but it’s not on its knees either. The leadership has a good story to tell domestically: they forced the great enemy to come to terms, almost like the US embassy hostage crisis did with the Carter administration in the late 1970s.
But despite any story, Iran is in a bad shape. Its regional allies are on retreat, its economy is in tatters, and its oil blackmail didn’t really work. In other times, with that war and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, there would be lines at gas stations and oil prices over $300 a barrel. It didn’t happen.
Still, at this point, the US and its allies need a feasible medium- to long-term strategy for Iran. Moreover, Iran is not a problem to be considered in isolation. Its strength comes from backing by Russia and lukewarm support from China.
Russia is in growing difficulties in Ukraine; China may be getting cold feet about the series of troubles it has gotten drawn into.
Russia is not winning, and it won’t. North Korea has grown closer to Russia, and that chumminess is fueling an arms race in Asia that has only bad outcomes for China. If South Korea and Japan spend more on defense and clamor for nuclear weapons, officially against North Korea but really against China, Beijing loses much of its regional clout, and the situation becomes more complicated.
Chinese President Xi Jinping went to North Korea on June 8 to assess the situation, but seemingly secured no concessions from his counterpart, Kim Jong-un, who is pressing ahead with his nuclear program.
Iran itself is a prickly ally. Tehran is not ready to listen to Beijing’s plans, just as it is not ready to listen to American plans. Iran is an oddball that causes trouble for the US, but it could cause trouble for China, too.
Still, Iran is a unique blend of radicalism and pragmatism; it knows that war could resume at any time, especially since many in the region and in the USA are unhappy with the peace agreement. Iran can see that its backers are weakening, and the overall situation is not conducive to escalation.
The next few weeks and months could be crucial.
The US needs long-term plans that should start with the key issue—China. Iran is only one of many consequences.
