Iran’s move on Hormuz is short-term. If it doesn’t get its act together, the whole region could turn against it. US boots on the ground in Iran won’t work. But a coalition of disgruntled neighbors could move against Tehran, changing the ball game.
The new wave of attacks against Iran has an undefined time frame, but at least a clear, limited objective – to reopen the Strait of Hormuz against Tehran’s claim of control. It ushers in new possibilities and threats for Iran.
Thirteen tankers crossed the Strait of Hormuz on July 8 compared with an average of 33 per day over the previous week. Traffic slowed after Iranian attacks on ships triggered a renewed round of fighting with the US. Still, the oil market is not pricing in a complete closure of Hormuz. However, markets could become more nervous next week if a truce isn’t re-established.
Key to the truce is a hazy compromise in which Iran doesn’t threaten the Strait, without explicitly declaring such a threat. Behind the short-term tactical agreement lie medium- and long-term considerations.
By threatening traffic through Hormuz, Iran deprived itself of long-term leverage (the possibility of closing the Strait), which would have worked only as long as it wasn’t used.
Gulf States are developing alternatives to bypass the Strait of Hormuz via pipelines to the Indian Ocean or the Mediterranean. Eventually, the Hormuz chokehold will apply only to Iranian oil, with no clear alternative routes. Tehran would be trapped by its own strategy.
Some in Iran may believe that, in this situation, they need to maximize their short-term advantage and try to partially close the Straits. This is enough to pressure the market. Even if 90% of traffic continues, a few sporadic attacks are enough to drive up insurance premiums and, consequently, oil prices, affecting global markets. It’s minimal pressure for maximum results.
To avoid that, some wanted to occupy Iran’s Kharg Island, which controls access to Hormuz.
But after Iraq and Vietnam, who can guarantee this won’t be the first step into quicksand? You occupy Kharg, and the next day, US troops there become targets of missile batteries you haven’t identified or eliminated. So you have to go deeper, sinking further into the quicksand.
Some in Israel may want regime change, but Turkey, the Saudis, Egypt, Pakistan, etc., do not, because today they have something like a “sporting” alliance with the US and difficult or less than cordial ties with Israel. But if Iran becomes pro-Israel and pro-US, this redefines the power balance in the region. All the others will have to reconsider their relations with each other and with the US.
No one wants a nuclear Iran, or one that controls Hormuz, but a pro-Israeli Iran is another matter entirely.
Amid this general chaos—with an open war in Ukraine, an undefined conflict with China, and a runaway nuclear rearmament in North Korea—is it wise to embark on an uncertain adventure in Iran?
In this situation, Iran appears to have only a short-term game, threatening Hormuz and dragging its feet with its fissile material.
Then there are two competing strategies in the US and Iran. The administration of President Donald Trump may want to bring some form of closure to the war as soon as possible to avoid interference with the difficult Midterm Elections next November. Iran may want to drag on opening and shutting the spigot of threats until the elections.
But this strategy, like the Hormuz threats, has a short shelf life. Before the elections, Trump may be interested in concessions, but after the elections, that interest will diminish.
Moreover, the nuclear threat and the chokehold on Hormuz have de facto created a new convergence of interests beyond Israel’s position. Turkey, the Saudis, Pakistan, and India may have an interest in pushing back Iran and, with time and patience, could be coaxed into acting to reopen Hormuz and halt Tehran’s nuclear program. Such action could be very different from a US-Israel move.
This creates new openings and challenges for both Israel and Iran. Tehran may not have much time to decide how it wants to play things out.
The purpose of Iran is to remain an independent country and not again become a US satellite as it was from 1953 to 1979. It also supports the resistance of peoples against terror regimes as Israel practices in Gaza, on the West Bank and in southern Lebanon. UK did the same in Western Europe during the Second World War.
In 2003 Iran ended the nuclear weapons program it had inherited from the Shah regime. The late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei issued a Fatwa that called owning and using nuclear weapons Harram, a sin, but made an exception in case it would be necessary for the independence of Iran. The recent aggression by those nuclear armed rogue states US and Israel might move Iran to develop nukes, but I do not think so.
It was Ali Khamenei who decided that Iran’s defence would be based on rockets and drones. Iran lacks armed forces able to occupy other countries, but its missiles are able to cause vast destruction. In the recent war US lost radar equipment in the Gulf area worth more than a billion dollars. So while being no threat to its neighbors it is able to defend itself. Recently it even damaged three US warships.
We see that the vast majority of the Iranian population is in favor of a strong rejection of the US demands.
On the other hand occupation of Iran by US would need an army of more than a million men. An expeditionary army needs a home organization ten times as large. Building an army more than twenty times the size of the current army needs some ten years and trillions of dollars.
Iran will have won this war when US accepts that it has lost – even if it costs twenty years as in the case of the war against Afghanistan.