American pressure on Iran is shifting the Eurasian balance in a new direction and could give the US new leverage with China. Yet Beijing is preparing.
US forces are converging on Iran, and some action against the Ayatollahs’ regime could occur over the next few days or weeks. It might be intended to weaken the regime as support for the ongoing protests and as a reprisal for the bloody crackdown. The regime could emerge shaken but may still survive.
It’s unclear how the Iranian situation will develop, but the issue is evolving, and there are two hypotheses to consider about its future. What would happen in the region if something changed in Iran, and what might such a change look like?
The action could also help US President Donald Trump spin the current narrative in a different direction. He was pushed to step back from his plans to take over Greenland and pulled back ICE officials from Minneapolis after a second killing. A success in Iran could give him a positive spin ahead of the April summit in Beijing with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
A leap of faith; what if the Ayatollahs’ regime fell?
If a regime change occurred in Iran, it would change almost everything in the Middle East, because an Iran that returned to a Western orientation would alter regional relations with Israel. A post-Ayatollah Iran would very likely be pro-Israel rather than anti-Israel, as the present regime is, and that would change regional interactions, including with Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Those two countries have also made significant contributions in recent years to stabilizing the region. But if Iran became more pro-Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia would have to rethink their positions. Most likely, they are already thinking along these lines.
Turkey has sometimes taken an anti-Israel stance, whereas the Saudis have mended fences with Israel.
Another critical factor is Pakistan, which was brought into the Gaza peace initiative and committed to sending troops against the Houthis in Yemen. Historically — regardless of the governments in power — Iran has had a good relationship with India but not with Pakistan.
What would a renewed Indian presence in the Middle East’s political geography mean? India is more pro-Western and historically pro-Iranian, which would also be very significant.
Overall, if a change did occur, the Middle East could find a new balance in which Russia and China are effectively more marginalized, with more players in the same broad Western alliance. This new Middle East could be more complicated. Europe could be partially excluded from this great game because it didn’t play an active role.
Changes in Iran?
How this change could occur is unknown; there is no certainty. There are two poles of direction for an internal movement. One is apparently that of the son of the former Shah, the new Reza Pahlavi, who is not yet supported by Trump, nor are the other forces, namely the minorities: Kurds, Baloch, and Azeris, primarily.
In light of what happened in Venezuela, one possible route could be the elimination of the top leader or a group of top leaders, followed by an accommodation with someone who remains and switches sides. This has been a historical approach used by the United States in Germany, Italy, and Japan, where part of the old ruling class was decapitated and another part was retained and used.
The Iranian ruling class has contacts not only with the United States but also with Israel; Israel has significant influence and penetration capabilities in Iran, despite everything, and this was evident in the attacks and assassinations in recent months. So that could be one path.
If Iran remains under the ayatollahs and the current protests do not produce significant effects, there could be an expansion of Turkish power. Then Israel could adapt to it, or the Turks could find a new balance with Israel. Since both Turks and Israelis are pragmatic, they may find an equilibrium.
Conversely, if Iran returned to the Western sphere, all calculations and balances would be upended, as Turkey could be constrained. There could be an alignment between Israel and Iran that would effectively contain Turkey.
The Kurdish issue is essential, and it’s a wild card. Kurds are highly divided. There are Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. These four Kurdish groups are themselves divided into various factions. Not all Kurds, and not all factions, agree or get along, even though many countries in the area fear a large Kurdish union. For the moment, this is not happening.
China?
Unlike many past instances involving Russia, Gaza, and Venezuela, when Beijing always picked the losing side, this time Beijing kept its distance and may be trying to talk to different actors, as it does in Myanmar, for example, where it has ties to both the government and parts of the opposition.
A sensitive issue is that if only Iran wavers, the US will have put another chokehold on oil exports to China, after Venezuela. In Venezuela, the US has allowed oil supplies to China to continue moving, and most likely the same would happen with a pro-Western Iran. Still, the possibility of a US chokehold on oil supplies would change the dynamics between Russia and China. Currently, China buys oil from Russia at a discount and can leverage its position with Moscow by juggling several alternatives. Those alternatives would remain, but China’s wiggle room could shrink. If that happened before the April summit, Trump would have one more bargaining chip.
In this situation, it is significant that Beijing is not openly supporting Tehran. This could be the first positive result of the recent purge in the Military, the body responsible for defining China’s strategy. China’s new approach might be changing.
(thanks to Giuseppe Rippa for his advice)
