A complex thread connects Russia, Iran, Turkey, Israel, the Saudis, and the Houthis – the wars over the price of hydrocarbons at Western pumps. Jerusalem may need to reconsider its ties with Ankara.
It’s unclear whether it’s only shadow theater or something is truly moving behind all the recent posturing about Russia, Iran, and the Houthis on the eve of a tricky midterm election in the US.
US President Donald Trump announced a controversial agreement to supply Russian oil to the US. The agreement is intended to lower oil prices, but many doubt it will have any effect. Russia has diesel shortages due to Ukrainian bombings of Russian refineries.
Rumors circulate about lines at gas stations in Moscow, which is usually well supplied. People also say Russia is reimporting some Chinese diesel and that China is burning more coal to cover the shortfall. Russia may even import supplies from Iran through Caspian Sea ports.
In this situation, it’s doubtful Russia has any real diesel surplus to spare for America.
Moreover, the main cause of the shortages is Iran’s blocking of the Strait of Hormuz and of Bab al-Mandeb through its Houthi proxies.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has leverage over Iran. If he really wanted to help Trump, he’d pressure Iran to cave and reopen the supply routes. Without that, what is the reality of the US-Russia agreement on diesel sales?
In a parallel development, Turkey might step in to roll back the Houthis, who now threaten Saudi Arabia from Yemen. It might be risky. The Houthis have proven to be tough customers, uniting turbaned warriors in flip-flops and computer nerds. Turkey might need a massive force to push them back. It can’t risk failing. If it does, Ankara could squander all its political capital, accumulated over two decades of careful maneuvering.
If Turkey limits or eliminates the Houthi threat, clearly with US agreement and Pakistan’s backing, Iran is under siege.
A new geography of the Middle East would emerge, in which America, rightly from its own point of view, might play Israel and Turkey off against each other. A Turkish intervention would be an American vote cast against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the eve of Israel’s October 27 vote.
Some in the US blame Netanyahu for convincing America to intervene against Iran in hopes of toppling the regime. The regime is still standing. Recent opinion polls suggest it’s unclear whether Netanyahu will secure the majority needed to continue ruling the country. US support for a Turkish intervention against the Houthis might be a counterbalance to Netanyahu’s Israel.
If Turkey intervenes in Yemen and fails, the Houthis might become the true stronghold of radical Shia Islam. Iran’s economy is shattered, inflation is sky-high, women have stopped wearing the once-mandatory veil, and the moral police have disappeared from the streets, having been recruited to fight against the Americans.
The country might resist because there is no internal armed force—the army, the police, or the Revolutionary Guards—willing to rise up to topple the regime, even though the regime itself is in tatters.
Conversely, if the Houthis won a Turkish attack as they pushed back the Saudis, regional dynamics could shift.
It could significantly move oil prices in the next few weeks. There could be lines at gas stations, and there could be a danger of a Shia takeover of the Holy City of Mecca, which has been under Sunni rule since the 15th century. A radical Shia group simply threatening the Holy City of Islam could shift the global Muslim balance and reignite a global wave of Islamic radicalism.
After the vote, Israel, with or without Netanyahu, may want to rethink many things. It has to decide whether to patch things up with Turkey to ensure Turkey beats the Houthis or to leave Ankara alone. For Israel, it’d be a disaster if Turkey loses, but it wouldn’t be much better if Turkey wins without Israel’s support. With American political and strategic support and Saudi money, Turkey would become the region’s main player, eclipsing Israel.
It’s unclear whether the crafty Houthis are open to a bargain and to negotiations for a peaceful settlement that avoids a risky confrontation with Turkey.
But these convoluted maneuvers can’t be announced at a press conference and won’t affect oil prices until they deliver results. However, the results could come only after the midterm elections, too late for Trump’s political needs.
