A crucial assessment of the situation in Gaza from Ely Karmon, an Israeli intelligence expert, to the main Catholic daily in Italy, Avvenire. Karmon is also a member of the Israeli non-partisan group, the Coalition for Regional Security. The problems today are rooted in the choices made in 2009. To achieve real peace, these issues must be addressed.
It was already in 2009, and more so after the Israeli Protective Edge operation in Gaza in 2014, when Ely Karmon warned politicians against a strategy for Gaza that he described as ‘unrealistic and dangerous’. Fifteen years later, history has proven him right. A senior researcher at the International Counter-Terrorism Institute (ICTI) and lecturer at Reichman University in Herzliya, the centers he works for has fellow researchers not only former armed forces officers, but also from the Shin Bet and Mossad, Israel’s main intelligence agencies. In this interview, Karmon wonders whether there is a connection between the “mistakes” of politics and the investigation ordered in March by Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara, after Shin Bet secret agents traced alleged payments of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The funds, which originated in Qatar, were allegedly intended for some of Netanyahu’s associates.
What didn’t add up for you back in 2009?
“Israel’s strategy towards Hamas and the region was unrealistic and counter-productive because it was based on keeping Hamas in power in order to weaken the Palestinian National Authority and allow the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, and cancelling the diplomatic negotiations sponsored by the US administration for a solution of the Palestinian problem. This approach led to intelligence failure and an underestimation of the threat posed by Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.”
Did the secret services underestimate these risks?
“Yes, but the main responsibility lies at the highest political level. Even when military leaders or security services raised critical issues, they were not listened to. For example, when Shin Bet had previously proposed targeting the Hamas leadership in Gaza, the operations were cancelled.”
Why?
“The government chose to manage the conflict with Gaza rather than address it strategically, giving up on supporting the return of the Palestinian National Authority, financing Hamas with Qatari money, and preferring to keep the Palestinians divided, while favoring the expansion of settlements in the West Bank.”
Were the consequences we know today already visible back then?
“Of course, the political leadership imposed its strategy on the army. The hubris involved the highest military ranks. It also ignored the warnings of the intelligence services. The Shabak did not recruit human agents within Hamas and preferred to focus on technological devices, while the Mossad did not cover the important arena of Hamas leadership abroad, focusing instead on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iran. Meanwhile, the Israeli executive, particularly the prime minister, allowed Qatar to finance Hamas, despite the information received from the security services. This is why we are now asking ourselves many questions about the failure of the attack on Hamas in Qatar on 9 September, while, in the case of the Hezbollah 27 leaders and Iranian military top brass and nuclear scientists, the operations achieved their objectives, including the killing of Ismail Haniyeh, chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, in Tehran.”
What are you referring to?
“There is an investigation into an alleged transfer of funds from Qatar to Israel to promote propaganda in favour of Doha. This would not be anything new. For example, according to official documents, US Attorney General Pam Bondi, appointed by Trump, received $115,000 a month as a registered lobbyist in the US Congress on behalf of Qatar. Only recently, after the Israeli Police investigation into funds from Doha, has the government’s attitude towards Qatar apparently changed.” The question is why President Trump informed the Qatari leaders about the ongoing operation, although he claimed the alert arrived too late.
After these two years of war, and as a result of the mistakes you have pointed out, would an agreement for Gaza, in addition to stopping the conflict, be enough to prevent an escalation of the conflict?
“The situation is delicate and explosive. There are risks of a new wave of global terrorism, as in the 1990s, as we see in the wave of antisemitic attacks against Jewish communities in Australia, Manchester UK, Berlin, Russia; and of regional escalation, especially if more worrying information emerges about Iran’s nuclear military program and its rearmament with Russian advanced weapons. For now, the preference is to avoid a large-scale direct confrontation with Iran, but the dynamics can change quickly.”
