China may be playing a complex chess game in Eurasia, with North Korea, Russia, and Taiwan as its pawns against the United States.
The war in Ukraine created a new opportunity for North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to pursue politics as his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, did eight decades ago between China and Russia. He gained leverage between the two, extracted advantages from both, and, in so doing, consolidated a special triangular bond. But China was not left behind. In fact, it may have become the steering force within the triangle, casting a new, more convoluted shadow over Taiwan, the island de facto independent but de jure part of one China.
Joseph DeTrani detailed (see here) recent ominous developments from Pyongyang. On Christmas Eve, a North Korean Santa Claus gifted the world with an 8,700-ton-class, nuclear-propelled submarine that could soon be armed with nuclear weapons. Two days later, Kim pledged the “blood, life, and death” of its people in the same Russian trenches.
DeTrani wrote: “Russia’s mutual defense treaty with North Korea is a major setback for the U.S. and our European allies and partners. Indeed, it was the US and the European Union — with South Korea, Japan, and Australia — that were building two light water reactors in Kumho, North Korea, in exchange for North Korea’s 1994 agreement to dismantle its indigenous nuclear facilities.”
Certainly, the US should try to talk to Pyongyang. But Kim could leverage bilateral talks with China and Russia to extract more while keeping the US dangling. Or the talks could be a ruse, with China or Russia (or both) using North Korea to mislead America.
Internal mysteries
The North Korean situation could be highly complicated. In 2013, Kim purged and reportedly executed his uncle, Jang Song-thaek, who might have been instrumental in Kim’s rise in December 2011 and was regarded as the second-most powerful figure in North Korea. Jang was considered the head of a pro-China faction. Yet, it might not just be Jang. The very selection of young Kim as his father Kim Jong-il’s successor might have occurred with Beijing’s blessing a few years earlier. Before 2010, China was North Korea’s primary lifeline and thus had significant clout.
Even after Jang’s purge in 2013, China continued to have a grip over Pyongyang. New groups of officials/businessmen engaged in freer trade with China. North Korea imported food, heavy oil, consumer and industrial goods, and exported an array of commodities, raw materials, and smuggled products.
The interests of these “China compradors” over more than a decade have become increasingly aligned with China and neutral toward, or opposed to, an opening with America. An opening with the US could benefit Kim, but it might leave the North Korean “China compradors” unemployed.
The new interests cemented the lifeline China had provided to North Korea since the late 1980s, when the USSR collapsed, cutting off all aid to Pyongyang.
The combined influence of the new and the past may now leave North Korea with little room to maneuver. China can drop North Korea, but not the other way around.
Likely, China doesn’t want North Korea to normalize ties with the US and potentially turn against Beijing. North Korea could be a prize that China could offer to America in exchange for Taiwan.
China, North Korea, and Taiwan have mirrored destinies. In 1950, China had to choose North Korea over Taiwan. The USSR pushed Beijing to intervene in the Korean peninsula, whereas Mao would have preferred to invade Taiwan and do without the nationalists of the KMT who had fled there. Now, Beijing may dangle the trade of Taiwan for North Korea before the Americans.
Fast rearmament
By supporting North Korea’s nuclear program and rearmament, which may have accelerated after Kim visited Beijing last September (see here), China may suggest that the longer the US waits for the trade, the harder it will be to handle North Korea, as Pyongyang acquires more weapons and missiles. By 2035, Pyongyang may have over 100 nuclear warheads.
Surely, North Korea knows about China’s intentions, and it might want to free itself from Beijing’s embrace. But it’s not easy, given Beijing’s chokehold. It’s possible that Beijing has even the capability (and determination) to kill or capture (more difficult) Kim if he strayed.
Kim’s leveraging of Russia against China may be also limited. In fact, since the onset of the Ukrainian war, China has gained massive leverage over Russia, thus it controls both Moscow and Pyongyang. Moscow can ill afford to anger China, which is vital to President Vladimir Putin’s survival, even without the Ukrainian war, and to favor North Korea. In fact, the Russian predicament reinforces China’s grip on Pyongyang.
It is a strong triangle in which China has room to maneuver, while the other two have limited options; in 1950, Russia was the decisive mover. China has no experience with equal alliances, but it has an old tradition of handling vassals and minions, granting them space to move while setting boundaries, primary directions, and red lines.
