China is the elephant in the room of the Ukrainian peace talks, and the Witkoff plan looks like a way to have Russia be the winner while the US and China destroy each other.
A real point of the peace plan on Ukraine is: what does China think? In fact, China is the elephant in the room during negotiations. Without China, Russia’s economy and industry probably would’ve collapsed a couple of years ago, around the time of the mercenary Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny.
China faces two key deadlines with the US. The first is the April summit with President Donald Trump, who is expected to visit Beijing. The second is the renewal of the rare-earth agreement in October, just before the midterm elections.
The practical question is: Does China want to address these two deadlines by helping to remove the thorny issue of the war in Ukraine from the table? And why would Beijing want to do that?
The war in Ukraine is politically fraught for the United States. It’s increasingly divisive and at the heart of a fierce domestic political debate.
For over a decade, the US foreign-policy debate has roughly split into two camps: those who think Russia and China should be confronted together, and those who believe the two countries should be separated at almost all costs. The sticking point so far has been ‘cost’. How much can the United States afford to pay Moscow to move away from Beijing, and conversely, is it believable that Moscow would let go of Beijing, or vice versa?
So far, there have been no clear answers, which has contributed to the American stalemate and indecision over Ukraine.
Ukrainian Taiwan
Yet another source of uncertainty concerns China rather than the United States. In recent weeks, China has become embroiled in a heated controversy with Japan over Taiwan. The Japanese prime minister, Sanae Takaichi, stated that military action or naval blockades on the island — de jure part of a single China but de facto independent — would pose a vital issue for Tokyo. Moreover, Japan has deployed 100 medium-range missiles to defend Taiwan from the Ryukyu Islands, at the far southern end of the archipelago.
Beijing fears that, without the threat of military force, Taiwan could slide toward independence. Japanese public opinion supports Takaichi; few voices have criticized her either in Japan or in the region. In fact, Lawrence Wong, the prime minister of Singapore — a city-state traditionally close to Beijing — said on November 19 that Japan’s political presence in the region is an element of stability.
The storm seems unlikely to cool down. Each day, more factors add to it. China has recently questioned Japan’s legitimacy over Okinawa, or the Ryukyu Islands, an issue that will fuel further controversy and does not solve Taiwan’s problem.
Behind Taiwan, there is Russia. Japan and South Korea are increasingly alarmed by Russia’s rearmament and hostility, which fuels North Korea’s aggressive and unstable behavior. Japan never signed a peace treaty with Russia after World War II, and South Korea only has a truce with North Korea. Many in Asia see Russian rearmament as a direct regional threat.
In this situation, does it benefit China to back the war in Ukraine? There are pros and cons.
The war distracts global attention from China. When it began three years ago, the US reached out to China to pressure Russia to stop the conflict. Talks stalled mainly because China asked the US what Beijing would gain in return for its support, and the US responded that China should do it ‘because it was the right thing to do,’ not as a political swap.
After three years, the dynamics may have changed. In many ways, this conflict takes a toll on China. Indeed, trade with Russia has risen; China’s support for Moscow does not come gratis et amore dei. Still, there is a political burden on Beijing – its growing regional isolation. Perhaps Beijing could help if some security concerns were addressed. If Russia did not collapse, if Russian President Vladimir Putin survived, and if Moscow did not detach from Beijing, perhaps China might have an interest in ending a dangerous chapter and focusing on managing an increasingly volatile situation in Asia.
China could, without losing face, indirectly offer Japan and other Asian countries an end to the war in Ukraine and restrain Moscow in return for cooling down on Taiwan.
Devils in Details
However, this is a delicate calculus, where legions of devils hide in every detail. In the end, the alchemy of the agreement could favor China rather than America. That might also be acceptable in Washington if a comprehensive, long-term deal with Beijing seemed achievable between next April and October. But if that does not happen, it could be difficult.
In any case, it’s unlikely that Russia would fully trust America after nearly four years of war backed by Beijing and completely turn away from China. In Moscow, they might not blindly trust Beijing, but they probably trust Washington even less. It’s a balance that doesn’t seem likely to be achieved anytime soon.
The recent report of the US special envoy Steve Witkoff’s talks with Russia added a new element. The gigantic business agreements between the US and Russia, which could be sealed with a peace deal on Ukraine, might prompt further caution in Beijing.
From Beijing, it may look like a modern version of The Three Kingdoms strategy, a 14th-century Chinese novel. Here, Zhuge Liang devised a convoluted yet effective plan for Liu Bei, an ambitious yet weak scion of the fallen Han dynasty. Zhuge pitted the two warring contestants against each other and had Liu Bei emerge the winner after the two killed each other. Mao used the strategy during WWII, pitting the Japanese against the nationalists of the KMT and vice versa. He may have tried to do the same with the Soviets and the USA, but Stalin pinned him down, pushing him to fight the Americans in the Korean War in 1950.
Now, Putin’s moves look to Beijing like a renewed Three Kingdoms strategy, pitting the USA against China and vice versa. The classic way out of it would be to corner Putin.
Peace Pieces
Therefore, although some peace pieces seem to be gaining ground, the war in Ukraine is likely to continue in the short term. It is no longer just about Europe; it is increasingly about Asia as well, where dynamics are different and even more complex. A gesture could be a peace truce for Christmas, but even that may remain elusive.
Here, as a final footnote, there might also be a turf war within the US administration over how to view the current situation. Should A) Russia/Europe experts prevail and talk about China, or B) should China/Asia experts prevail and talk about Europe? During Cold War 1, it was clearly A, even during the Korean and Vietnam wars; now, there could be reasons to have B. In China and Europe, many may prefer A; in the rest of Asia, B may be selected.
