The American show of force in Venezuela may put a different spin on the PLA’s complex military transition and the party’s future political direction.
“The US operation to abduct Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro serves as a reminder for China to bolster its air defenses and counter-intelligence protections,” reported the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, quoting Beijing’s sources
The event occurred as China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was undergoing a significant reform and in the wake of an unprecedented purge. Its political status was reduced, a step neither Mao nor Deng took, perhaps also out of fear of reprisals.
President Xi Jinping, who promoted both the reforms and the purges, faced no backlash and may have emerged stronger than ever. For the first time in the history of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the army is no longer the party’s kingmaker; rather, the CPC is the PLA’s absolute ruler. This capsized the party-army relationship, typical of China since the fall of the Qing Dynasty.
Yet this may now change due to events in Caracas. But first, it may be necessary to take a look at the politics of the PLA.
Army not Party
The CPC began as a revolutionary political organization, but Mao Zedong established an army in the countryside and overthrew the political leadership that sought to control his forces. The first time was when the urban revolutionaries, led by Zhou Enlai, fled after the failed Shanghai uprising in the late 1920s. The second time was in the late 1930s, when the USSR attempted to oust Mao, sending a group of Moscow-trained Bolsheviks led by Wang Ming.
The army was the main power in China at that time. In 1912, General Yuan Shikai overthrew the Qing Empire and attempted to proclaim himself emperor. Then Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek marched north with the KMT. The Red Army defeated him, moved south, and took over China.
Deng Xiaoping, political commissar of the 4th Route Army, prevailed over Chen Yun, who had greater party seniority but no real military experience. In 1989, during the Tiananmen protests, Deng regained control because the army followed him rather than the CPC secretary Zhao Ziyang. From then on, the party decided that the party chief could secure his position only as head of the PLA.
It was very different from the first communist country. In the USSR, the party founded the army. It established political commissars to keep former Czarist officers in line when they were forced to fight the White Army, which Czarist officers also led.
In the Chinese Red Army, the political commissars were also intended to bring together former warlords or bandits, but they came to perform a different function. Party commissars had to shape the army into a party. The party commissars explained to soldiers why they fought and for what.
This role has been fulfilled over the past 10-15 years by the Party School and the Defense University, where officers and cadres learned management and strategy, but mostly party ideology. Here, much work is devoted to “party building” (dang jianshe gongzuo 党建设工作).
The present reforms began in 2015 and, as Dennis J. Blasko argues (here), were the “most sweeping series of reforms since the 1950s when it adopted the Soviet military organization structure. The new reforms sought to better prepare the force for deterrence, warfighting, and non-war military actions… While the bulk of structural reforms and personnel reductions were completed by 2020, additional adjustments have continued, and further adjustments can be expected to keep pace with advances in technology and changes in the domestic and international environments… Military modernization is scheduled to extend to 2049.”
The reforms cut “300,000 personnel, about half of whom were officers, mostly from the Army. That left an active-duty force with an end strength of approximately 2 million. Concurrently, the number and proportion of non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and non-active duty, uniformed civilian staff were expanded.”
The land army, in theory less technologically advanced, still dominates the PLA, as analysts have documented (here). However, in a significant shift in December 2025, Yang Zhibin and Han Shengyan were promoted to the Central Military Commission (China’s top military body). Both hail from the technologically advanced Air Force.
Foggy Future
However, this new structure leaves something unclear. If the army is the party’s core, its survival is the party’s survival. But if the party is above the military, the army might, over time, develop priorities that diverge from the party’s. It is an old concern, dating to the 1980s, in the internal debate over separating the army from the party. Until Xi, the CPC refused to implement it for fear of a military uprising. Xi evidently gained complete control of the army without undermining his power.
In this new power structure, the army may be more loyal to Xi personally than to the party as an institution. This could provide additional insurance for Xi’s control, but it might also raise new questions about the future.
Xi, 73 this year, is in good health and, with personal clout within the PLA and more removed from the party structure, could engineer new strategies to retain power. The 2027 party congress may witness a decimation of the present Politburo. Only those born after 1960 should remain, and it’s unclear which formula Xi will use to hold on to power for his fourth term. It’s in fact improbable that he will step down. His new grip on the PLA could be the key. Then the PLA’s decisive political role, out of the door, reenters from the window in a different structure.
Mao or Deng controlled the army because they were army commanders. Yet even they could not simply direct generals. They had to consult other army commanders, who had been their comrades. Party chiefs Jiang Zemin or Hu Jintao, without military experience, may never have felt fully confident in ruling the PLA.
Xi undertook over a decade of reforms, a couple of years of massive purges, and may have gained a grip on the PLA that neither Mao nor Deng achieved.
The question now is whether Xi can turn his PLA into an effective fighting force. It is unlikely (here) in the short term. It might take years for the new generals to gain the political confidence to take the initiative on the battlefield. This situation may have been sufficient to ensure that the 2027 party congress proceeds as Xi wishes.
However, the US operation in Venezuela may create a different sense of urgency about the PLA, which could play for or against Xi’s political game with the military and the party. It’s too early to say, but it might be the real development to watch in the next few months.
