Parades and Charades at Tiananmen

Truth and smoke, mirrors and substance surrounding the recent twin events in China: the SCO meeting and the military showcase. Beijing claimed a new friendship with India and a world-class army. The overall message is one of defiance toward America. 

On September 3, with a historic military parade in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping showed a defense system capable of countering the United States. It stated that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is no longer an American junior partner, as some Americans have believed for the past 50 years, but a global power ready to defend and expand its interests.

Second, the Indian presence at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin two days earlier confirmed that the PRC is gaining new allies while the US is losing friends.

Third, China announced its philosophy for international politics. It seems to follow a policy of non-interference with the aims of great powers unless their claimed rights are violated. In theory, non-interference applies to all countries. However, the case of Ukraine shows that significant countries, like Russia, whose perceptions must be taken into account, and less influential countries, such as Ukraine, which must also be accommodating, exist. Finally, China re-examined history, which it considers the most crucial ideological element. The American victory over Japan in WWII was erased in favor of a version of history that states Russia and the Chinese communist army defeated Japan.

Besides, there is a general global perception. America discusses tariffs to rebuild its economy; Beijing emphasizes regional growth and pledged a $1.3 billion fund for a SCO development bank. Beijing’s help might come with a high price, but is that cost higher than the Western one? For now, US assistance won’t come, no matter the cost.

Here, it is a Chinese articulated and comprehensive strategy that doesn’t confront the US head-on but seeks out all the spaces it can use to insert itself, including those of its US allies. 

Da Wei presents the background well (see here). There has been a psychological strategic decoupling between the US and China, along with growing Chinese confidence in managing the international situation over the past eight years. This reduces interest in reaching an agreement and leads to a more tense bilateral atmosphere. It’s Cold War II, and it could last a long time.

On the other hand, Nirupama Rao, a senior Indian diplomat, argues (see here) that “the US can’t undergird the Asian balance.” It casts a shadow over the Quad (an Asian military agreement between the US, India, Australia, and Japan, ostensibly aimed at China). It could cause Japan and Australia to hedge their security strategies and rely less on the US against China. Asia’s security landscape would change significantly.  The threat from the United States to China may have decreased. Another player might emerge with a coordinated Asian security system, independent of the US but effectively targeting China. 

Some Asian countries might avoid ending up in a situation like Europe’s, where Russia caught the EU off guard with the Ukrainian invasion. It exposed the EU’s heavy reliance on NATO, which turned out to be unreliable. This situation could significantly impact Chinese security calculations. However, it also poses challenges for America. If this trend continues, the US’s stance on China may not align with the interests of its allies or Asian security, potentially undermining Chinese interests within the US.

Offense?

China has learned to capitalize on American mistakes. Just as Beijing has adopted a defensive stance, it can also craft an offensive strategy. This reveals China’s current vulnerability: its struggle to carry out political offenses effectively. Therefore, if the US avoids errors, the impact of Russian or Chinese successes can shift considerably.

Chinese psychological decoupling and its statements on September 3 from the United States suggest that Beijing no longer believes in a possible reconciliation with the US, neither in the short nor in the medium term. It may seek a status quo. This changes everything. It’s like in a personal relationship: as long as there is hope of fixing things, you avoid making other commitments and wait. But once you accept, even only internally, that there will be no return, completely different dynamics begin. That is precisely what is happening: China has started thinking in terms of a new world order, with its own rules, independent of Western standards. This is the overarching message that emerges strongly these days.

Then there’s Trump’s presidency. Trump brought a possibly needed shake-up to American domestic and foreign policy, which might have become too rigid with outdated ideas. However, with rapid, sudden, and somewhat unclear changes, he introduced extreme elements of global uncertainty, prompting major rethinks everywhere. Today, America seems to say one thing but then quickly shifts and says another, demonstrating a high level of unreliability. As a result, some countries might consider China to be better. Despite its flaws, China may appear to be more dependable.

A roadmap

Given this, we need to think about several implications for the upcoming months. 

1. Everyone should try to help America and Trump “calm down.” Another 40 months of this presidency under current conditions risk destabilizing the world and causing chaos, where the only winner might be Russia, now a declining power. China, on the other hand, isn’t genuinely interested in widespread chaos. It might be pleased with the end of American primacy, but chaos raises questions about its trade surplus, which depends entirely on the US and Western countries. Without that surplus, China faces significant economic challenges. Russia itself needs a way out of a war that is bleeding it dry, similar to Afghanistan in the 1980s.
2. Another crucial point is that America must set clear boundaries with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It’s vital to show the world that Trump is not Putin’s puppet. Continuing down this path, the suspicion that Putin is blackmailing Trump leads other countries to distance themselves from the US. They might prefer to deal directly with Putin instead. Genuine pressure on Russia is necessary to end this suspicion finally.
3. The third point is preparing America for the October-November summit between Trump and Xi Jinping. The August 15 Trump-Putin meeting was a failure. The world can handle the mishap of a crucial summit, but failing two major summits would be very damaging.
4. The fourth point concerns India. India has not firmly aligned itself with China or Russia; it has been very cautious. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi traveled to China after visiting Tokyo, and during his visit, he spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Modi also met with the Presidents of Armenia and Belarus. Armenia is hostile toward Russia, and Belarus is gradually moving away from Moscow. India may aim to distance itself from America, which it feels has betrayed it, but it also does not want to ally with Russia or China.
5. The fifth element to watch in the coming months is Japan’s role. Japan is India’s main political partner. There is a strong relationship between the Indian and Japanese Prime Ministers. India and Japan have a historically close connection, with Indian nationalists being pro-Japanese during World War II to oppose British colonial rule. Japan is currently working on two fronts: one, to “restore order” with the American administration somehow; and two, to engage with Asian allied countries. Before heading to Washington to meet Trump, the South Korean president met with the Japanese Prime Minister. The absence of the United States in Asia doesn’t mean there is a void; Japanese presence is already filling part of the emerging American gap.
6. The sixth and most delicate point concerns China’s role. China targeted Modi because he changed his stance. There was no successful Chinese initiative. Understanding the international reality is a challenge. So far, China has struggled to grasp Western dynamics surrounding COVID, the potential outcomes of the Ukraine war, and the Middle East conflicts. China needs to develop a more realistic perception of reality, which would enable it to be more effectively proactive.

China-India tense outlook

China has been given a rare, golden opportunity to rebuild political and economic ties with its most important neighbor and possibly with the rest of the world. The signs of a future China-India alliance will be evident in three key areas. 

The first and most challenging aspect is trade. India aims to export a variety of products, including medicine, electronics, and high-end goods, to China. It doesn’t want to be just a source of raw materials. In return, it plans to import high-quality machinery and components from China. 

It is sensitive because it could weaken China’s industry and overall global competitiveness. However, it addresses the core issues in China: overproduction, a closed domestic market, and defense against foreign competition. 

The second element involves Indian neighbors, all of whom have been courted by China. Here, a delicate game unfolds as China tries to contain India by leveraging its Indian neighbors. Simultaneously, India counterbalances this by aligning with Japan, Vietnam, and Korea—countries bordering China and worried about its actions. It’s a game of double encirclement that remains unstable. 

The third element in theory is the simplest: the border area. The two sides have reached a new agreement; they pulled back troops, but tensions persist. This has happened several times before, and eventually, mutual suspicion reemerged and reignited tensions. 

It’s unclear whether it will last longer this time. Overall, if China manages its ties with India well over the next 5 to 10 years and becomes a market for Indian goods, it could help reduce Chinese overcapacity. This could serve as a model for China to engage with the world. 

The issue here isn’t about China-India ties but about China itself. The PRC needs economic reform. It must allow inefficient and unnecessary companies to fail, thereby opening the market to genuine domestic and foreign firms. It won’t be easy, and it will show whether China-India’s relationship can endure and if China is truly prepared to compete globally.