New realism ought to set in the US administration. Dialogue is essential, but handing Russia a victory it hasn’t gained could undermine the world order.
On Saturday, amid widespread global criticism of a US-proposed peace plan for Ukraine, President Donald Trump stated that the plan is open for discussion.
The plan, presented by Trump’s ally Steve Witkoff, appears, in fact, quite flawed, unlike the one for Gaza. There is no winner but Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faces domestic difficulties, so it may suit him to portray himself as the nation’s defender while America seeks to bend him. That can help him regain support.
Conversely, giving in to US demands would mean being overwhelmed by the opposition and risking political lynching.
The agreement is extremely vague, making implementation very difficult. It’s unclear, even if signed, when a ceasefire would start along the entire front. There could be a paradox: an agreement signed without peace on the ground.
In America, the Republican Party is in disarray. They have recently lost three elections. Trump’s approval ratings are very low, and the Epstein scandal looms. It might be in Trump’s interest to claim a success to divert attention domestically. A deal on Ukraine could provide temporary relief, but it would be hard to frame it as a success given the controversy. Ultimately, beyond short-term fixes, everything risks falling back on Trump.
Furthermore, peace in Ukraine would cut into profits for American arms and oil industries, which continue to sell to Europe during the war. Currently, the war doesn’t cost America in soldiers or resources, but is an opportunity for growth. Without war, there would be less demand for weapons, and Europe might revert to purchasing cheaper, more convenient Russian oil. The stock market might react negatively to such a deal.
Conversely, looking very cynically but realistically, a war in Venezuela could be helpful. It exposes narco-traffickers, removes an autocratic regime, limits hostile presence on the American continent, and opens the market to some of the world’s largest oil resources. It would be a new growth driver for the American economy.
China also dislikes the peace plan. Beijing prefers not to be in the spotlight. As long as the war in Ukraine continues, the world’s focus is elsewhere. When the war ends, everyone will turn their attention to China.
If Trump really cut American support to Ukraine, he would let Europe fall into Russia’s hands or an anti-American future leader like Hitler. The America we know today would soon disappear, and Trump himself would be at serious risk. Europeans would develop a defense completely independent of the US, creating a situation similar to barbarian troops fighting without Roman legions and eventually sacking Rome.
Alternatively, Poland, the Baltic states, and possibly Finland — maybe even Germany — might open a new front without waiting to be attacked by Putin. Or Europe could come under Russian influence, with Moscow threatening the US from the Atlantic using its new anti-American leader.
There is a real problem: Europeans cannot be a near-dead weight in defense, but this can’t be fixed by sacrificing the only Europeans fighting back—the Ukrainians.
Another problem is the narrative, which in war matters as much as, or more than, military success. Look at Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Gaza. Militarily, the Americans in Vietnam or Afghanistan had defeated the Vietcong or the Taliban, but the dominant narrative portrayed a different story. In Gaza, Hamas was destroyed, yet propaganda managed to claim it was nearly a draw.
Today, the Witkoff plan has no support outside of some people in the Washington administration. It faces criticism in Europe, America, and Asia. It is characterized as a surrender to Russia. So, whether it truly is or not, since the dominant narrative views it as a capitulation, it effectively becomes one. Thus, it is a significant political victory for Russia, handed to it by America. A peace that is seen as humiliating Ukraine only benefits Russia and no one else.
At that point, since the American defeat would not be against distant Vietnamese or Afghans but against direct historical enemies like the Russians, who in Europe or the Middle East would need America? In Asia, who can trust America in its friction with China? Japan, India, and others must think for themselves. China itself — why should it discuss geopolitics with America? It did not already trust it, and trust certainly has not increased today. This means the possibilities not only for agreement but also for constructive discussions with Beijing would be shrinking. Better to deal with Russia or with Japan and India.
Nixon, who recognized the need to end the Vietnam War but not to allow a victory for the USSR, re-engaged with Beijing before reaching the peace agreement with Hanoi. Today, there is the chimera of detaching Moscow from Beijing. America has tried unsuccessfully for more than ten years, even before Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Back then, the US’s mild response to Russian aggression was a strategy to keep channels open with Moscow, while its relations with Beijing were rapidly deteriorating. It didn’t work because Putin consistently raised the stakes.
Today, during this war, ties between Beijing and Moscow are much stronger than before. Even if Moscow wanted to, it could not abandon Beijing overnight. And would Moscow trust an America that spins around like a Bolshoi ballerina? China, though inconvenient, is far more solid and reliable.
China fears being abandoned by Russia and has prepared countermeasures — it won’t let go so easily. It’s unlikely to believe that Putin would leave China and side with the United States. Is it in exchange for a possible American pledge to concede Central Asian countries (now under Chinese influence) to Russia? Or to expel the Chinese from Siberia?
These promises are vague and highly uncertain, while the Chinese presence remains real and tangible. When the Americans presented the Witkoff plan, the Chinese announced cooperation with Russia on a comprehensive, integrated missile defense system. Who in Moscow could refuse the Chinese offer in favor of the American one?
The Russians, of course, have every reason to show and tell the Americans whatever they want. Also, because American interest in Russia raises the price of what to ask from China. For the Russians, there are benefits all around.
This American administration is very realistic, but realism must be grounded in reality, which must therefore be recognized and accepted for what it truly is, not what we wish it to be.
If they get Ukraine, Russia will take everything it can and more. There is no reason to hold back. America needs to rethink this issue in a very different way.
(I thank Marco Mayer for his kind valuable advice for the article)
