Seeking peace is crucial, but the Middle East agreement is a cautionary tale against being too optimistic about a deal with Russia.
US President Donald Trump reportedly sent Pentagon officials to Ukraine to restart peace talks. The move comes after the White House has seen multiple previous overtures to Moscow yield little progress. The recent peace outline is controversial, but controversial or not, there are many reasons to remain cautious.
After reaching a peace deal on Gaza, it is reasonable to try to double down on Ukraine. But there are essential differences between the two peace “deals.”
The strength of the Gaza agreement is that it involved every regional actor, while excluding powers favorable to Hamas (Iran, Russia, and China). In doing so, it isolates and pressures Hamas while also reassuring Israel. Therefore, although the concrete implementation remains uncertain, the overall framework is encouraging.
A successful agreement for Ukraine should have similar characteristics. The involved parties would include European countries and Turkey (on Ukraine’s side). It’s unclear whether it could exclude Iran, China, and North Korea — the primary suppliers of arms and economic backing to Russia — or how it would handle India, a major buyer of Russian oil.
In any case, is it realistic to bring everyone to the table for an agreement that, unlike Gaza, has no clear winner? And could a deal work without a broad international framework, like with Gaza?
In Gaza, Israel had won decisively. It had weakened the power of Iran’s allies in the region and Iran itself, Hamas’s leading supporter. In the end, when Hamas still refused to cave, it killed some Hamas leaders in Qatar.
Moreover, Iran is complex. The fall of a president or an ayatollah doesn’t necessarily undermine the system. Therefore, Iran can accept a setback or defeat and still survive. Russia is run by one man, President Vladimir Putin. If he accepts something that could be portrayed as a defeat, his rule could be crippled.
Finally, the Abraham Accords, signed during the first Trump administration, provided a ready framework for extension and adaptation to the current affairs in the Middle East.
The situation in Ukraine remains markedly distinctive. Fighting continues fiercely on the battlefield. Politically, Russia has been defeated, but Moscow still produces, stashes weapons, and recruits new soldiers. Ukraine has also achieved political victories, but it cannot reclaim some of the occupied territories.
One option could be a ceasefire along the current front line, but for now, neither side seems ready to accept such a pause. Furthermore, many of Russia’s neighbors worry that Moscow might use a truce to prepare for a broader conflict in Europe in the coming years.
Supporting these worries, they note that Russia is increasing its weapons stockpile instead of using all of them on the battlefield.
Then there’s the Asian angle. Especially after the dispute with Japan over Taiwan, China feels America is breathing down its neck. If the war in Ukraine ended—even without considering political earthquakes in Russia that could impact Beijing—the world’s attention would turn to China.
Beijing may have little interest in that attention. It is also quite likely that, after nearly four years of Chinese support for the war, Moscow has limited room to maneuver with Beijing. In other words, even if Moscow wanted to accept a ceasefire, Beijing might have the leverage to push Russia in another direction.
Peace in Ukraine could create new flashpoints for China, and Beijing could struggle to control them. China may be eager to prevent the situation from spiraling out of control—especially when it is directly involved, such as with Taiwan. A “steady” conflict in Ukraine might provide a form of stability for Beijing while it remains engaged in intense trade talks with the United States.
Currently, China has pushed back against America by leveraging its near-monopoly on Rare Earth Elements (REE). Beijing may want to maintain that advantage for as long as possible, and war in Ukraine could help.
Chinese interests could also help explain why the US pushes for peace in Ukraine, but this is also why Beijing may not want peace there.
It is possible that Trump managed to get Russia to break off with China, or he got China to tag along with this peace plan. Then it’d be interesting to know what either country got out of the deal, and the price could go well above Ukraine. It’d be a mini-Yalta, like the agreement the USA, USSR, and England had at the end of WWII to reorganize the world.
Even then, the new mini-Yalta might not work. The atmosphere about Russia in Europe has drastically changed. Many countries are convinced that Russia is the enemy and is preparing for an attack on Europe.
Then Russia will keep its word, and what would be the damage in transatlantic and transpacific relations? Both the EU and Japan and Korea are worried about Russia’s aggressive posture, and a cozy deal here could embolden it. Erratic, unreliable, and assertive, North Korea would be a winner too.
Then the final question is, is Ukraine really on board with it? Is it Europe, the UK, or China? Even if so, the peace in Ukraine could find much bigger hurdles in its implementation than the already difficult Gaza peace agreement. Maybe it’s more practical to pursue other paths.
