As the first round of negotiations between the US and Iran failed, Chinese interests may loom larger, and Tehran may need a deal with America more than ever.
The Iran of the ayatollahs has institutional and strategic depth. The institutional depth was evident after the attack in mid-June of last year. The regime did not collapse. There were very widespread protests, but in the end they were suppressed with bloodshed, without bringing down the regime.
This proves that the system is far more complex and resilient than, for example, Russia’s. Iran managed to negotiate a ceasefire last year, leaving the country’s government essentially intact. In Russia, President Vladimir Putin probably cannot negotiate a ceasefire because he fears he would be unable to maintain his power. So the war goes on.
Today, despite the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Iran has continued fighting for over a month without yielding. Indeed, probably out of desperation and feeling cornered, it used its ultimate strategic weapon: the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
There is also strategic depth. When Bush Sr. proposed that Iran join or support a coalition against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991, Tehran agreed, deliberately setting aside the fact that America had supported and armed that same Iraq during the long war of the 1980s against the newly installed Iranian regime.
Furthermore, Iran has demonstrated imperial-religious ambitions by supporting and spreading radical Shia ideology throughout the region. It backed Assad in Syria by allying with Putin’s Russia, Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shia Arabs in Iraq and Bahrain.
This decades-long strategy has proven both ambitious and pragmatic, aiming to corner Sunni forces in the region. In doing so, it has suffered many setbacks; the regime has been shaken but has not fallen. This perhaps suggests the regime has a complex, well-articulated structure that is not easy to bring down through a coup or the death of the supreme leader.
It means America and Israel must seek interlocutors within the regime to explore whether there is room for liberal reforms in Iran.
Military pressure, as always throughout history, can play a role, but short of an actual territorial invasion — with the risk of Iran fragmenting along ethnic lines, including Kurds, Baluchis, Azeris, and Arabs — it is unlikely that military action alone will topple the regime. Mobilizing the various minorities is also fraught. The Turks do not want stronger Kurds in Iran, for fear of encouraging Kurdish independence movements in Turkey. The same applies to the Baluchis in relation to Pakistan.
Furthermore, America faces growing internal opposition from both the right and the left, from Democrats and MAGA alike. There are no clear strategic objectives. Moreover, rightly or wrongly, many believe that President Donald Trump was dragged into the war in Iran, led by the nose by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It is bad for Trump because Netanyahu’s promises of regime change didn’t materialize. But it’s also bad for Netanyahu, who now has less clout with the US.
Against this backdrop, Iran may be making a strategic mistake. Blocking the Strait has forced America to choose between widening the war and reaching a ceasefire. But continuing to control the Strait creates global problems.
There is no worldwide consensus granting Iran control over such a critical chokepoint that determines global energy prices — the backbone of the petrodollar, itself a cornerstone of the dollar’s centrality and the American financial system for 50 years.
The Hormuz challenge draws in Europeans and Asian countries alike, from South Korea to Japan to India. All of them, for better or worse, accepted a world with a central American role — can they accept that centrality being replaced by Iran? And then there is the role of the Gulf states, Turkey, and Pakistan. Control of the Strait would give Tehran regional hegemony and put Saudis, Turks, and Pakistanis under pressure. They might prefer to go to war against Iran rather than accept this strategic reshuffling.
These general conditions should give pause to Iran, China, and the United States alike.
The Strait of Hormuz is too delicate and thorny an issue, and Iran should immediately relinquish it to create a more positive climate not only with the United States but, above all, with the countries of the region.
These general conditions should also prompt China to reflect. Today, it has benefited from American missteps in Iran. But if it becomes more deeply involved with Tehran, for instance, by supplying military equipment, the situation could change. Moreover, China lacks the military capacity to guarantee freedom of navigation on global shipping lanes — a guarantee America has provided for eighty years, as the heir to over two centuries of British naval dominance. And while the RMB is expanding in global markets, the Chinese currency — not freely convertible — and the Chinese stock market — subject to heavy government interference — are not genuine alternatives to the dollar or to Wall Street at present.
An American withdrawal within its own psychological borders, more than political ones, would leave a more chaotic world in which China could end up paying higher costs in every sense. In theory, America — which today is an exporter of oil and gas and has taken control of Venezuela, with its enormous hydrocarbon reserves — might benefit from stepping back from the Strait, redrawing the boundaries of its politics and currency, and leaving the thorny disputes of the Middle East to someone else. In other words, the US has a Plan B.
China also has a Plan B — if everything goes wrong, Beijing can turn inward. But the US, as many Americans believe, could actually benefit from isolation. Beijing, which has benefited greatly from opening up over the past 50 years, could cause great suffering for its own people if isolation occurs.
Iran, in any case, would find itself more exposed and at greater risk if America withdrew from the Gulf. Above all, it is in Iran’s interest to maintain American engagement, which can, on the one hand, restrain Israel and, on the other, hold back Turkish, Saudi, or Pakistani temptations. This restraint capability is unlikely to be effective or to come from China or Russia.
This is the moment when Iran should truly consider a future with broader horizons, open itself to serious internal reforms, and prevent a descent into the abyss.
(I thank Marco Mayer for the inspiration and lost brother Zhang Xiaodong, a companion for over 20 years of discussion on the Muslim world.)
