Is America’s recent fascination with the European far right misconstrued and risky for the US? The United States has made similar mistakes before; now might be the time to be more cautious.
In 2011, I was in Washington when a well-known geopolitics expert of Jewish descent told me about America’s rising confidence in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. They had just overthrown President Hosni Mubarak, but my friend said they weren’t a problem—that they were democratic and liberal.
Personally, I was skeptical, especially since my favorite writer, Naguib Mahfouz, hated them.
Just a few years earlier, America had attempted but failed to establish democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. The religious conflicts, driven by Islamic fundamentalists in both countries, posed serious challenges for the United States.
A few days later in Beijing, during an interview with China Central Television’s English service, I was prudent. If the Americans were betting on the Muslim Brotherhood, they surely had more information than I did; still, I argued for more caution and for supporting Egyptian security chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in any event.
Al-Sisi was like an insurance policy if something went wrong. If the Muslim Brotherhood proved less than reliable, Al-Sisi could step in. And that’s exactly what happened; Al-Sisi saved Egypt and the Mediterranean from disaster.
Approximately 15 years later, isn’t the U.S. repeating the same mistake with the European far right?
Today, the Washington administration is leaning toward supporting the far right, frustrated with the current policies of the EU and individual European countries.
Furthermore, a shift in ruling European parties could make European allies more aligned with the current American government’s sentiments. There are also practical reasons. Traditional parties are clearly losing momentum and lack ideas, while the new far right is energetic, proactive, and very confident.
Still, is that really enough? Maybe, as with other cases, Americans looking abroad are mistaken.
The American fascination with fascism is old. The United States looked favorably both Italian fascism and German Nazism. They later regretted it. The Egyptian affair is more recent.
Every country makes mistakes, and larger nations with more responsibilities are likely to make more and bigger ones. It is also correct to try to go with the flow, give old enemies a chance, and win over new allies.
However, perhaps here in Europe, with far-right parties, the main point is that organizations that declare themselves radical often are—and must be, by the very fact of having declared it.
The example of the Italian radical right, where Giorgia Meloni, originally from the far right, shifted toward the center, might not directly apply to countries like Germany, France, or the United Kingdom.
The Italian political system, a relatively recent creation heavily influenced by complex historical factors, cannot be taken seriously in its ideological commitments. Therefore, when pressured, the radical right or left tends to shift their positions. This is not true in other countries.
I personally was in favor of Meloni as Prime Minister a couple of years before she took office. At the same time, I’m now unsure about other European far-right candidates. It’s no guarantee that I’m not making a mistake now, but still…
Furthermore, if the far right gains power in Germany, France, or the United Kingdom with American support, even Meloni’s currently moderate right could turn radical. At that point, what will the European far right, which is nationalist and historically anti-American, do: will it try to understand Washington or become like the fundamentalists of Iraq, Afghanistan, or Egypt? Only in Europe is there no Al-Sisi insurance policy.
Finally, there is another factor. Today, the American arms and oil industries have a clear interest in supporting Ukraine against Russia (see here).
However, the European far right is pro-Russian, not just in geopolitical terms but also in a deeper ideological way. It longs for a return to the era of great European empires before World War I.
This creates a visible conflict between American industrial interests and European priorities. As the war in Ukraine quickly progresses with new weapons deliveries and renewed political backing for Kyiv, one of the key measures for far-right parties will be their stance on Moscow.
The new broad peace framework in Gaza shifts all focus back to Ukraine (see here). If Russian President Vladimir Putin does not abandon the fight and accept a peace deal, the war could escalate quickly, and all Europeans will be called upon more forcefully to declare where their loyalties truly lie.
It means the US might be better off engaging with everyone without taking sides, especially since the ruling parties are clearly pro-American, and the new US stance could upset them. It would be awkward if the latest American allies end up losing the elections.
