Beijing has a clear, long-term strategy to survive and win a global power competition. It has nimbly adapted to setbacks. The US seems less clear. Asians may decide to move on the PRC alone.
China and the rest of the world may be at a grand turning point, but it is very unclear which direction history will take. The present rise of China could be like the last flames before collapse, as happened 400 years ago with the Ming Dynasty and 200 years ago with the Qing. In both the 1620s and the 1820s, these dynasties seemed invincible; yet both fell only a few decades later.
Or China’s rise could resemble that of the Ottomans, who took Constantinople in 1453 and were defeated for the first time only at Vienna on September 12, 1683. Symbolically, the self-styled new caliph Osama bin Laden chose September 11 to mark his “victory” against the new infidels in 2001. The Ottoman Empire finally tumbled in 1919.
Or it could be that the peaceful forces of markets and capitalism will drive everyone to find common ground and grow together.
China’s Tao of War, Now
Beijing has a clear, long-term strategy to survive and win a global power competition. It has nimbly adapted to setbacks. The US seems less clear. Asians may decide to move on the PRC alone.
China and the rest of the world may be at a grand turning point, but it is very unclear which direction history will take. The present rise of China could be like the last flames before collapse, as happened 400 years ago with the Ming Dynasty and 200 years ago with the Qing. In both the 1620s and the 1820s, these dynasties seemed invincible; yet both fell only a few decades later.
Or China’s rise could resemble that of the Ottomans, who took Constantinople in 1453 and were clearly defeated for the first time only at Vienna on September 12, 1683. Symbolically, the self-styled new caliph Osama bin Laden chose September 11 to mark his “victory” against the new infidels in 2001. The Ottoman Empire finally tumbled in 1919.
Or it could be that the peaceful forces of markets and capitalism will drive everyone to find common ground and grow together.
Still, at least for now, people are preparing for the worst. Everyone fights from their own starting conditions. Short, stout Romans protected their upper bodies with shields and cut at their enemies’ legs and feet. Tall, agile Gauls leaped from above and struck their enemies in the head and neck. History tells us who won. But then, as now, the fight is not just about two players.
China Strategy
There are two possible grand strategies confronting one another: the Chinese strategy and the one led by the United States.
On January 3, 1995, I published an essay[1] in which I noted China’s centrifugal forces. I expected that the country would either be torn apart by them or, if it managed to check them, would trigger centripetal energies that could set all of Asia — and thus the whole world — revolving around it.
China is surrounded by more than 20 countries and territories, many of them hostile. In this sense, its strategy is almost mandatory: it must try to dominate these centrifugal forces and transform them into centripetal ones. The Silk Road idea, now embodied in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is also meant to draw the world toward China.
If China can hold the center — which is also at the heart of Eurasia — for long enough, it can wear down hostile and opposing pulls and triumph. This strategy must be paired with the ability to avoid a humiliating defeat at sea, where China is weaker, historically and in terms of power projection.
The construction of an enormous “civilian” fleet — in practice under military command — along with a missile deterrent against the American navy, marks the country’s maritime strategic center of gravity. Beijing can hold this position for many years, perhaps even many decades. China’s industrial and economic strength, together with its reach into Central Asia, can draw in the entire continent and the world, while its naval and missile power can deter any politically sensitive military confrontation.
China’s strategy is thus the BRI: the “road” connects Central Asia, and the “belt” connects the seas, mirroring Marco Polo’s travels to and from China. It combines the theoretical strategies of controlling the Asian “heartland,” as in Mackinder, with Mahan’s theory of sea power — thalassocracy — and control of some vital sea chokepoints.
It could have been about peaceful integration if it had chosen to use the BRI as a new platform for cooperation, calling on other countries like the US, Japan, and India to its helm. It chose to use it as an instrument of power projection, and thus it took a different turn.
Correspondingly, the strategy of the United States — or of China’s adversaries in Asia, with or without the US — runs in the opposite direction. They must hold the seas, try to constrict China’s maritime living space, and establish a foothold in Central Asia to contain and break China’s grip on that region.
Russia and Iran extensions
If these are the confronting strategies, perhaps the wars in Russia and the Middle East can be seen in a different light, as spinoffs of a larger confrontation around China. Had Russia easily won in Ukraine, it would have secured a direct line of communication between China and Europe. Conversely, Ukraine’s resistance and Europe’s commitment against Russia have cut off that route.
Similarly, Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel could and should have established Iranian dominance over the region. Both gambles have failed: today, both Russia and Iran are weaker. For both, the problem now is how to extricate themselves from an impossible situation. No one — starting with China — wants recourse to nuclear weapons, which would open the door to total nuclear war where there are only losers.
At the same time, Russia now appears incapable of winning on the battlefield and is rapidly crumbling economically and socially, imposing a cost on China. After over four years of war, Russia has very little to show for and its dependence on support from China and North Korea, its former minions, doesn’t look too glorious.
Conversely, the Ukrainian nation was born. It has the largest army in Europe and the most innovative and battle-tested military industry. It can soon become the strategic keystone of the continent.
Iran’s situation is slightly different. Its regional projection was crippled. Syria, a decades-long ally, has fallen. Hamas has nearly disappeared, while the Houthis and Shia militias in Iraq are weaker. Iran’s own civilian and economic infrastructure is badly damaged.
In the short term, Iran secured concessions from the United States by blocking the Strait of Hormuz. But over the medium term, that blockade has made Hormuz less relevant. Gulf countries are now arranging ways to bypass it, with pipelines running directly to the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. The Strait will remain important mainly for Iran’s own production. Thus, the short-term advantage of the blockade becomes a medium- to long-term disadvantage for Iran, which permanently loses its historic strategic leverage and risks being blocked in the Strait of Hormuz.
On the other hand, there are two issues: regime change and the nuclear question. On the nuclear issue, no country in the region — and perhaps not even China — wants Iran to have the atomic bomb. After the experience of North Korea’s arms race, which has pushed all of East Asia to rearm out of fear of Pyongyang, a nuclear Iran would push Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia toward rearmament, multiplying the risks for everyone.
On regime change, views differ across the region. A pro-American Iran might not be welcomed by the Saudis and Turks, already American allies, who would have to make room for a new player, perhaps at the expense of their own interests. Therefore, Iran’s real strategic interest would be to become an American ally. That prospect further complicates the Ayatollahs’ position.
China is weaker but…
But this does not change the overall picture. Today, China is strategically weaker than it was in 2022 or 2023. It objectively has less room to maneuver. But this does not mean it has been defeated — quite the opposite. Beijing’s ability to avoid being cornered in Iran’s situation over the past year demonstrates its agility in redefining its short- and medium-term strategies while maintaining its long-term direction.
China’s industrial and export capacity is a strategic advantage far superior to the atomic bomb. The Soviet Union exported little and offered business opportunities to almost no one. China, by contrast, offers profit opportunities to many. Its products are cheaper for consumers, and trade in its goods enriches many businesses in the West in the short- to medium-term.
China’s wager is that these business interests in profiting from China will hinder, or even prevent, the implementation of a political, economic, and therefore also military strategy by the United States and its allies. Western businessmen had nothing to gain from being pro-Soviet. Some Western businessmen have a great deal to gain from being pro-China, although most are losing money and jobs. Still, it becomes a domestic competition between the two parties (pro- or anti-China) in the US and other Western countries.
China’s ability to win over businesses in Hong Kong or Taiwan is an important strategic element that could be — and perhaps already is being — applied on a global scale. Some Western businesses will balk at the prospect of a confrontation with China if it undercuts their short-term business interests, even if they could lose more in the long term.
The bet is that some Western businesses will undermine Western political interests because politics and business are not fully aligned in the short term. The case of TikTok is exemplary. In the long term, it could be important for the US to get the popular app out of Western markets, but short-term benefits have so far made that impossible.
The Chinese weak point is that Chinese economic expansion, oblivious to other countries’ long-term well-being, will multiply enemies and hostile interests. They will clamor for war against the People’s Republic of China (PRC). To solve this, China should open its markets and make the RMB fully convertible[2], but this is not happening.
The USSR claimed to represent the Western working class, and part of the labor force became its fifth column in the West. It forced Western governments to implement social welfare programs to prove that capitalist countries could care for people better than the communists.
China has a fifth column of entrepreneurs invested in China’s businesses, but their interests could dwindle over time as China’s exports push them out. Therefore, China’s own success becomes its enemy. Beijing may hope the tipping point in the West will come once China has firmly established its dominance. Then it might change international economic rules. It’s tricky, but it may work, and these prospects might push some Westerners to side with the future winner.
No clear answer
Against this, the US apparently has no clear or mature answers. The longer this Western uncertainty persists, the more China benefits, and the more this contest could tangle and stretch on for centuries rather than decades.
In the long term, the whole Western system could fall. Or it could find a new route to the Indies, as Columbus did 40 years after the fall of Constantinople. Or the West could get its act together.
Still, the game is not limited to two players.
“China should have massive leeway to move into the cracks the US is creating. It doesn’t. It may be proof of two things: of China’s own problems, but also that Trump, despite everything, is a catalyst to something real, mainly that the world needs a different order”[3].
In Asia, many countries feel politically pressured by China. Here, economic dynamics are distinctive. Their business was undercut after the 2008 financial crisis, when the PRC chose not to revalue its RMB, pushing Asian exports out of the market and straining local economies.
In that moment, the US was pressuring Beijing, though to no avail, to revalue its currency, which could have given its neighbors breathing space. The local elites are more “nationalistic” and less receptive to Chinese business lures. Seeing the US hesitation, they might not wait for the US to decide what to do and could move sooner and faster, precipitating an unprecedented crisis.
The US fleet can be scared away, but Japan or India can’t be moved to another continent. China may wish to bring its old imperial vision into the modern era, but these countries do not like that vision, and forcing them to accept it could be very troublesome.
Westerners have no direct memory of China’s imperial past; for them, it is a literary construct, and they may be cavalier about it. Asians do, and may not be too fond of revisiting it in the present.
If Asians were to move on their own, it could be worse for both China and the US. China may believe that without American backing, Asian countries will simply kneel to the PRC. The opposite could be true.
Japan had to be nuked twice before it surrendered. India managed to shake off the yoke of the British superpower; will it now be meekly harnessed by the PRC? Vietnam fought against Chinese authority for two millennia; will it bend now? These three countries alone could draw the rest of the region and shatter all Chinese dreams.
While the US may want to think long and hard about what to do, China might want to reassess its strategy. It might work with the US, but it might get things even worse in Asia.
Then, perhaps, rather than being torn between centrifugal and centripetal pulls, China should, in the lull before the US shapes its own strategy, consider ways to fully integrate into the present world. That would avoid both pulls and hostile strategies. But trust is missing on all sides, and the paths to peace become extremely difficult.
[1] In https://www.limesonline.com/rivista/la-cina-e-un-giallo-14561566/ Una, dieci, mille Cine
[2] See here https://www.appiainstitute.org/articles/china/exchanging-politics-for-economics/
[3] https://www.appiainstitute.org/articles/china/maga-and-its-china-troubles/
