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The Treacherous Summit

/ Director - 20 November 2026

Four aspects could be damning for the US-China-Russia summit; the role of the rest of Asia might prove the slipperiest.

Form and substance

The substance of the meeting was weak, even though many topics were addressed on the surface.

The main issue was reportedly nuclear weapons. It concerns North Korea’s nuclear rearmament, which greatly worries Asia and could drag the region into an unprecedented arms race, as well as China’s, which is less overtly controversial but still very significant.

Iran was also discussed, evidently, with a commitment to open up trade flows, that is, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, which are currently blocked, directly or indirectly, by Tehran. So far, however, these seem to be statements of principle.

A third element, which meets Russian needs, was a rebuke in principle of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, which has issued a warrant against Russian President Vladimir Putin for crimes committed during the war in Ukraine.

Those are the matters of substance.

Ethereal as they are, matters of form may matter more. Chinese President Xi Jinping appeared decidedly friendlier toward American President Donald Trump. He greeted him at the airport, hugged him on the tarmac, put him to his right for the photo-op, and dined at his table, all political and diplomatic courtesies he did not extend to Putin. These political gestures can mean a lot or nothing: it depends on what follows and on what America and China do.

Yalta or not Yalta

Another question is whether it was a Yalta or not. The Russians wanted to declare it one; the Chinese wanted to stress that it was a meeting among three permanent members of the UN Security Council, who are also members of APEC, hence a diplomatic format that kept everyone happy.

It was certainly not a Yalta, because the three did not divide up the world. In fact, there was no world to divide up, and while America’s and China’s roles are important in any case, Russia’s is far more controversial. Moscow has great nuclear power, but it is an economic dwarf, and also a conventional military one, given that it cannot win the war in Ukraine.

The 1944 summit in Yalta, toward the end of the Second World War, was something different.

First of all, America was the great engine of everything, because it enabled Britain to sustain the war and also Stalin’s USSR. Moreover, America and Britain were joined at the hip, and Russia, in any case, an ally. There were no other protagonists on the ground. China, which would later be admitted to the UN Security Council, was largely occupied by Japan; France was entirely occupied by Germany. The defeated were either already beaten or about to be. Italy had already surrendered, and Germany and Japan would do so within a year.

Today everything is very different. However large America and China may be, there are many middle powers to be reckoned with, more important than Russia itself.

Where is the EU?

The European Union, of course, was not there, and not being an APEC member is only part of the story. It was the great absentee, but the fault lies with the European Union itself, not the others.

Europe’s central problem is that, for example, it has two seats as a permanent member of the UN: France and the United Kingdom. If the Union truly wanted to take a step forward, France or the United Kingdom could place its permanent seat at the disposal of the European Union.

The United Kingdom can rightly say: why should I do it, if I am not even in the Union?

France, by giving up its seat, would of course carry much less weight in the complex European alchemy.

These are delicate matters that reveal the weakness of the European Union, yes, but also, by now, the deep failure of the United Nations architecture, which must be revised or profoundly restructured if it is to begin to function seriously. Or maybe something else must be conceived entirely.

The rest of Asia

The main problem, however, might be the rest of Asia, because two powers decisive for the world’s future, India and Japan, were excluded from the three-way meeting. If Japan makes the best of a bad situation, India, with a different tradition, may harbor a deeper resentment.

Indian resentment toward the United States could be the real new source of uncertainty. Naturally, India now sees no great ally among the three, because neither Russia nor China wanted it at the meeting, and America did not advocate for it either.

The wound of India and Japan carries with it all the Asian countries. They were called to the APEC summit, practically only to put on a good show as the frame for the new “Yalta.” This could be the real long-term vulnerability left behind by the summit.

Francesco Sisci
Director - Published posts: 302

Francesco Sisci, born in Taranto in 1960, is an Italian analyst and commentator on politics, with over 30 years of experience in China and Asia.

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