Hormuz is a wrench in the global energy mechanism. It can’t break the global system, but it could very well break Iran.
America has a new deadline: May 10th, when President Donald Trump said he will be in Beijing.
By that date, the war in Iran may or may not be over. If it is over, the United States arrives in Beijing with a very strong hand; if it is not, it could turn into a mess for the Americans, giving the impression that they are not in control. Further delaying the meeting in case of continued war wouldn’t change the situation much.
The United States, therefore, has an interest in seeing it end—while Iran, on the other hand, prefers to see it continue. Regarding China’s stance, it depends on what Beijing decides: if it thinks a hard confrontation is unavoidable, it might try to undermine the American hand; if it believes relations can be repaired, it may aim to help find a solution. China can remain neutral—but providing its Beidou (Polar Star) satellite system to Iran against the United States or Israel would clearly indicate taking sides. That is a red line.
America, for its part, can decide to continue the war, end it, or suspend it — that is, wrap it up now and pick it up again after the Beijing trip.
The ideal outcome would be achieving another clear success: either destroying or capturing Iran’s enriched uranium, or gaining control of the Strait of Hormuz. The second option, in particular, is very sensitive. Closing Hormuz means Iran can control global energy prices — something the United States or the West cannot afford, but neither can the other oil and gas-producing countries in the region, who would recognize the return of Persian dominance over their neighborhood.
Seizing Hormuz would be ideal. But can it be accomplished in about a month, safely, without exposing American troops to Iranian fire — and thus avoiding a rising body count? At that point, American public opinion could become furious, and China or Russia might conclude that America has become bogged down in Iran like it did in Iraq for over a decade. Is it then possible to quickly and safely take the Strait while neutralizing any Iranian response?
In theory, yes — but in war everything is uncertain, and the United States has already miscalculated once, apparently assuming that the regime would surrender after the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
That probably didn’t happen because, without a supreme leader, the political system would need time to regroup and forge a new consensus — one that might turn out to be anti-American. However, without that consensus, no one may have the authority to say, “We surrender to the Americans and start over,” but the continuation of the war would be the default option.
In this situation, a series of risks looms: the possibility that the Hormuz operation may not go smoothly and that China or Russia could exploit the setback; and the chance that the Beijing summit might be delayed again or held with the Iran issue still unresolved.
In this interlocking web of constraints, there are no clean solutions — but there should be genuine political consensus among US allies based on solid facts. Iran is on its knees. It serves no one for Iran to be erased as a state, as happened to Iraq. However, that threat is less serious than losing control of Hormuz to Tehran. If push comes to shove, the United States can always retake Hormuz — even if it means dismantling Iran entirely. Dismantling Iran could create a geopolitical void from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, running through Iraq and Syria, which is barely standing on its own feet.
There is still time for diplomacy. Pakistan’s trip to China could be significant, but the real test is whether Iran opens Hormuz without demanding anything in return. The US should, in turn, avoid calling it a humiliation of Tehran.
That would give everyone time to think, reflect, and work toward a more comprehensive solution. However, with Hormuz blocked and energy prices volatile, extreme options remain on the table — while the clock is ticking.
On Methods
From this, two distinct policy paths emerge: one for the Holy See and another for Western countries respectful of the Holy See. The two cannot be merged. It would be ridiculous for the Holy See to base its policy on Western interests, and equally ridiculous to expect Western countries to do the same with the Holy See.
The Pope is the foremost religious leader in the world, beyond being the spiritual guide of Catholics. In that capacity, he must speak to eight billion people on earth, not only to a cluster of Westerners. He must also promote peace and cannot take sides in any war, because to do so would fling open the doors to every conceivable form of holy war — and holy wars, by definition, admit no resolution short of the annihilation of the enemy.
The wisdom the Church has been cultivating in recent years lies in engaging with everyone and seeking political solutions within that space, going beyond any specific religious faith. The Pope’s role, above and beyond every side — including his own faith — becomes crucial. That’s why the Pope, who is not aligned with the United States or Iran, or Russia or China, maintains an impartiality that becomes increasingly apparent as the UN’s mediating influence diminishes.
It is a precious role that cannot and must not be contaminated by the political demands of any one actor, as allowing that would compromise its very impartiality.
Western countries, however, are not the Holy See. They have depended on bilateral and multilateral relationships with the United States through NATO, the EU, and other alliances for their internal, external, and economic security. Each Western nation might decide that this approach is unnecessary and withdraw from NATO and the EU to align more closely with Moscow or Beijing. Such a decision is legitimate in a democracy, and anyone holding these doubts should express them openly so that the pros and cons can be debated transparently.
If, however, no such doubts are raised, Western countries can only fulfill their obligations as best as possible that stem from their alliance commitments. On this point, there can be no distinction between government and opposition.
Western countries may not want war today, but war wants them — and they are not the Vatican. It follows that there can and must be serious reflection and concrete steps to understand how to confront the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz; however, one cannot disregard NATO membership, nor deny the reality that Western countries have a vital interest in free navigation through that strait and, consequently, in keeping oil prices low.
On the other hand, if the US acts, it must involve its allies; otherwise, it risks breaking the alliance and becoming isolated. This issue isn’t just military; it involves politics and economics, and from there, it could become a slippery slope. Right now, transatlantic ties should be revamped, bringing Israel and other Arab allies into the discussion, acknowledging that Iran and Hormuz are no longer just regional concerns but global ones.
If so, in Western countries, both government and opposition must shed any “pacifist posturing” and present their citizens with the bitter chalice of the end of the good times. They face a complex and highly uncertain period in which, whether they act or choose not to act, the risks are immense.
