It’s not about Ukraine, but the future of America. Does US President Donald Trump want to be like Scipio, Hannibal, or Qin Shi Huang? In the end, it was all about alliances.
It was a pivotal moment for civilizations, the story behind the longest-lasting and most copied empire in history. It was the battle against the most formidable enemy, Hannibal, who harassed Rome for 17 years before finally being defeated. The war determined that writing is in Latin, not Phoenician letters, that Rome is everywhere in the world, while Carthage is a distant memory lost in the past.
The history of the West took a sharp turn in the 3rd century BC, roughly when China began to head in a new direction. In China, this moment is clearly recorded and celebrated: the first unification of the empire under the first emperor, Qin Shi Huangdi. Western history, however, is less clear. It doesn’t recognize with the same certainty the significance of the Second Punic War, the conflict in which Rome fought Carthage and where Scipio, ancestor of the Caesars, defeated Hannibal.
In China, the primary focus was on how the Qin state managed to gather resources and organize logistics to fight multiple wars against all enemies and wipe them out. For Rome, the point was the role of the allies. The Roman allies did not switch sides, while the Carthaginian allies did.
The Numidian Massinissa, Carthage’s confederate, turned against Hannibal at the final battle of Zama (202 BC) in Africa. Conversely, Hannibal didn’t conquer Rome despite 15 years in Italy. In fact, none of the major Italian allies defected, not even the mighty Greek city of Taranto, which Rome had recently defeated.
Taranto’s way to the Empire
Taranto had been subdued by Rome just a few decades earlier (281-275 BC). Taranto had been defended by Pyrrhus, a cousin of Alexander the Great, considered the greatest general of antiquity. Pyrrhus won every battle against the Romans, though at very high costs—hence we still remember Pyrrhic victories today.
When Hannibal attempted to court Taranto, the Greek city didn’t turn even after the most humiliating defeat in the history of the Roman army at Cannae (216 BC), barely outside Taranto’s gates. Rome showed it possessed remarkable resilience, would never surrender even to the worst enemy, and could rely on the strongest allies.
Is there a lesson in what America faces today? Does the United States want to be Rome or Carthage? Do Americans want Europe, which is part of their cultural DNA, to be Taranto or Massinissa? Or does America dream of becoming the next Qin state and destroying all current states? Also, does Europe want to be Taranto or what?
These days, Europe is outraged over the National Security Report published on December 4. The protests do not look promising for the transatlantic alliance, which has been a keystone of global security for 80 years. The focus is nearly all on Ukraine. The USA pushes for a peace settlement that Europeans oppose and fear.
Thirty Years ago
In some ways, the current trial resembles what occurred in Europe about 30 years ago.
In 1991, the disintegration of Yugoslavia confronted the members of the European Union — recently emerged from the collapse of the Soviet empire — with critical problems. At stake was not only the future of Yugoslavia but also that of the continent.
The breakup of Yugoslavia reopened old divisions in Europe with roots in the centuries-long struggle against the Turkish Empire’s expansion in the Balkans. These divisions split the loyalties of the European central axis: the relationship between France and Germany, “Framania,” which was then the continent’s political driver.
Germany supported the states of the former Yugoslavia that had been part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire — Slovenia and Croatia. France, on the other hand, backed Serbia. They were the ancient divisions that had triggered the First World War. Europe was unsure how to take sides or what to do. If it took sides, it feared that old allegiances would revive and break the union. So, it asked for American intervention.
The United States was hesitant to intervene. It did not view it as strategically essential and believed Europeans should unite around a common cause at that moment. Europeans ought to send troops under a single command to support the chosen side and, through that shared conflict, build the political and military unity needed to strengthen the Union. However, the Europeans did not act accordingly. America decided to intervene, even if only to address the European dispute.
While the US was providing aid, on February 7, 1992, the EU, led by Germany, France, and Italy—with notable opposition from the UK—signed the Maastricht Treaty, adopting a single currency that could have competed with the US dollar. The creation of the euro was not intended to rival the dollar, but many in China, then an emerging and ambitious power, saw it that way.
Soon after, between September 1992 and August 1993, the European Monetary System (EMS) collapsed. Its peak happened on “Black Wednesday,” September 16, 1992, when Italy and the United Kingdom exited the fixed exchange rate mechanism due to attacks on the lira and the pound.
The crisis was triggered by Germany’s tight monetary policy following reunification with the East. It revalued the mark within the EMS, which also had different interest rates on treasury bonds with limited currency fluctuations (±2.25%). It led to capital flight from countries like Italy and France, making the EMS’s fixed exchange rates unsustainable.
In 1993, several currencies were devalued, and on August 2, the fluctuation band was widened to ±15%, effectively suspending the European Exchange Rate Agreements and marking the decline of the EMS as a rigid system. It all accelerated the transition toward the euro.
Since then, transatlantic history has experienced divisions. Since the 1990s, Europe has significantly reduced its military spending, leaving the bulk of the defense burden to the US. Europe also felt pulled into lengthy and inconclusive conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan that fostered mutual distrust.
A Hiatus
Over thirty years later, with the war in Ukraine ongoing, Europe remains divided and may be weaker than before. It lacks the military capacity to aid Ukraine significantly, yet it supports it politically and diplomatically. Aside from Hungary, the continent, including the UK, is now firmly united with Kyiv and against Russia.
This time, however, this American administration isn’t eager to intervene in support of Europe and its unity. Instead, it promotes breaking that unity apart, pushing the Union back toward separate European nation-states.
Circumstances have changed since the early 1990s because of Russia. In the 1990s, Russia was neutral regarding Yugoslavia’s fate. Now, it is actively involved in the Ukrainian conflict.
The US might have many reasons to be suspicious of Europe, beyond the obvious claims about Europe’s weak immigration policies and cultural decline. Over the past 35 years, Europe hasn’t pulled its weight and still seems to drag its feet in the face of Russia or China.
On the other hand, one American strength is that it has allies, not vassals. Vassals are unreliable; allies are not. Therefore, in force calculations (aimed at intimidating Russia or China), you can combine your resources with theirs. But you can do that only if you accept that they are all the same—say, oranges. If you begin by arguing that you and other countries are not truly allied, and each should pursue its own national interests. You blame your problems on the “profiteering allies,” then you end up with oranges and poisonous fruits—you can’t put them together, or you’ll fail.
Massinissa resented Hannibal’s control, feeling he had been wronged. Meanwhile, Taranto (where I was born) stayed loyal for the opposite reason. As US alliances in Asia are strengthening, those in Europe are clearly losing pull. But the two sides of the Eurasian landmass are mutually dependent. It can be risky to stress one side of the landmass and overlook the other, as was demonstrated during the first Cold War, when battles in Korea and Vietnam directly affected the stability of the old continent. Ultimately, as Asians know and fear, both ends of the continent would lose.
