Realpolitik and power competition are strengthening the Myanmar military and reshaping regional and global geopolitics in a new direction. At stake is the fate of almost 4 billion people.
At a special meeting in Bangkok on July 12, ASEAN decided to re-engage with the Myanmar Junta after a long diplomatic freeze following the February 2021 military coup.
The meeting announced its intention to promote dialogue, strengthen cooperation, and support reconciliation in Myanmar following the country’s 2026 “political transition.” Several ASEAN member states have softened their stance after previously isolating the junta.
The “political transition” was a tightly controlled shift from direct military rule to a quasi-civilian government. The military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) secured an overwhelming majority in the parliamentary sessions held in March after a heavily restricted, military-backed election.
The elections were boycotted by opposition forces and restricted to areas under junta control, leaving out large swaths of the country. After the vote, lawmakers elected coup leader Min Aung Hlaing as president on April 3, 2026. This allowed him to step down as military commander-in-chief and to govern in civilian attire.
Great Game
It’s the Great Game at the crossroads of 4 billion Asian people, split across various fronts. Almost two centuries ago, the British conquered the Burmese kingdom (forefather of present-day Myanmar) and annexed it to their Indian empire, canceling a previous, hazy Chinese suzerainty. Meanwhile, the French were occupying Indochina and advancing from the East—the British further aimed at Tibet, the French at Yunnan.
Now it’s all different; no European barbarian is at the gate, but the local players have apparently inherited the game.
A brutal civil war, started after the 2021 coup, is ongoing in Myanmar. The military ousted the democratically elected government, which sought to end the ultimate grip on power of the military, also known as the Tatmadaw. The military has played a crucial role in Myanmar since its independence in 1948, and it’s almost a state within a state. It has roughly 150,000 to 200,000. It requires all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to serve for up to two years.
The fighting between the junta and a coalition of pro-democracy and ethnic armed organizations has claimed over 100,000 lives. It has internally displaced approximately 3.7 million people, almost 10% of the total population.
For years, India and ASEAN had cut off contact with the Myanmar junta, hoping the rebels would prevail. Still, after five years, that has not happened.
In the meantime, China has been talking to both the military and some ethnic groups to seek a peace that would safeguard its many interests in the area. In the north, some groups, like the Wa, who feel Chinese and even use the RMB and Chinese mobile coverage.
Beijing has interests in mining, logging, and the deep-water port of Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State along the Bay of Bengal,
After the controlled elections, the gears were set in motion. India decided it could not leave Myanmar to China.
International Travels
Between May 30 and June 3, Min Aung Hlaing was on a state visit to Delhi, his first overseas trip as head of state. He met with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on June 1. They signed agreements on critical minerals and rare earths, a rupee-kyat payment mechanism, and the revitalization of the Kaladan Corridor – a major trade and transit route connecting eastern India to Assam’s landlocked northeastern states via Myanmar.
It bypasses the narrow “Chicken’s Neck” (Siliguri Corridor), significantly cutting down transport distances and logistics costs. Moreover, passage through Myanmar is crucial for India to reach its regional partner, Vietnam.
Shortly after, on June 15, Min Aung Hlaing paid a state visit to China. He signed 18 memoranda, including progress on the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the port of Kyaukpyu.
The CMEC is an ambitious 1,700-kilometer network of infrastructure, pipelines, and transport links connecting China’s landlocked Yunnan Province to the Indian Ocean. It’s a flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and forms an inverted “Y” that runs from Kunming to the Myanmar cities of Mandalay, Yangon, and Kyaukpyu. The corridor would provide an alternative route bypassing the Malacca Strait, which could be closed to Chinese shipping in case of friction or war.
The pro-Western ASEAN thaw with Myanmar adds a third element to the shadow play. It’s unclear whether the moves by the three sides (India, China, and ASEAN) are coordinated or competitive, and to what extent. It’s also unclear whether the Kaladan and CME corridors can coexist. Japan and the USA are the elephants in the sensitive room.
