Does Russian President Vladimir Putin want to be canonized as a saint by the Russian Orthodox Church? Could his canonization help his hold on power in war-torn Russia?
The Russian Orthodox Church may be undergoing a shift in its religious orientation, further aligning its ideals with those of the Russian state, as was the case during the times of the Czars.
Yet this could create a deep fissure in society and widen the split with the rest of Christianity. Modern Russia has undergone significant changes since the fall of the czars, a century of communism, and exposure to the rest of Europe, as has Christianity.
“On the use of saints in Putin’s Russia: between spiritual search and theological manipulations” is the title of a multidisciplinary colloquium held at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Paris on October 6, presenting an issue of the journal Slavica Occitania (No. 61/2025). Alexander Nevsky (1221-1263), Fyodor Ushakov (1744-1817), Vladimir I (988 conversion to Christianity), Seraphim of Sarov (1754-1833), Nicholas II (1868-1918), Sergius of Radonezh (1312-1392): these are some of the saints whose memory is mobilized to serve Putin-Cyrillic projects and ideology.
It should be noted immediately that the memory of saints in Christian confessions (except for the Protestant tradition, which does not recognize them) is intimately connected with the need for models and guidance within individual Churches, and that it is sometimes used for political interests and national identity needs.
In some way, all saints are “constructed,” meaning they respond to a narrative that nourishes individuals and communities in Christian discipleship, emphasizing particular characteristics of their life and spirituality. The transfer of their memory to the civil historical field, and primarily the political sphere, sometimes improperly inflates reinterpretation to the point of transforming their cult into a tool for immediate political interests. Both the mentioned conference and the journal extend the references well beyond Russia.
Heroes, saints, and righteous individuals are being manipulated in the current context of the war in Ukraine and the cultural conflict with the West, revealing a parallel path between the autocratic government of the president and the ecclesiastical direction of Patriarch Kirill. This does not exclude the possibility that ideological manipulation coexists with an authentic spiritual search and that the needs of power centers utilize sincere popular piety.
According to the curator of the colloquium and the journal, Irene Semenoff-Tian-Chansky-Baïdine, “in Russia, after the adoption of Christianity at the end of the 10th century, the cult of saints has always faithfully reflected social and political evolutions. Today, some heroes of Russian history elevated to the rank of saints, such as Prince Alexander Nevsky, Dmitry Donskoy (1350-1389), or Admiral Fyodor Ushakov (the last two recently canonized), are summoned for the defense of the nation. The canonization of Emperor Nicholas II, a true anti-hero yet a model of sacrifice, has led to a rehabilitation of the monarchy and the old regime. Saint Vladimir “equal to the apostles” – Vladimir I Yaroslavich, who adopted Christianity in 988 – is widely used to justify the return to lost unity between Russia and Ukraine. Saints Peter and Fevronia of Murom (1167-1228; 1175-1228) come to the rescue of the traditional family. All this underlines to what extent the link between sanctity and nation resists over time” (from the introduction to the colloquium).
Without overestimating the specificity of the Russian case, there remains the emphatic and repeated assertion by Kirill of the “miracle” of the reference to the sacred memory of the nation by Russian power and the “Orthodox” Putin in particular.
Russian anti-Western civilization. While the cult of St. Nicholas of Bari is the most popular and widespread, as evidenced by the extraordinary celebrations associated with the pilgrimage of his relics to Russia in 2017, the reference to Alexander Nevsky is particularly notable. A hero of Russian history, he is now proposed to support the official national ideology. This is not a new phenomenon, as it was already used by Peter the Great.
The anniversary of his birth (800 years) was widely celebrated in 2021 as a state saint. “In the predominant political context on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, the anti-Western aspect of Alexander Nevsky was largely emphasized, and his celebration took on the character of an ideological-religious and psychological preparation for war” (I. Baïdine). His memory becomes part of the theology of war that accompanies and justifies the special military operation.
Also curious is the memory of Maria of Gatchina (1874-1932), killed during the communist regime, an expression of the “Church of the Catacombs” (thus in contrast with Patriarch Sergius’s compromise with the regime), venerated mainly because of her powerful intercession in daily difficulties.
The Feast of All Saints entered the Russian liturgical calendar in 1918, but its liturgical celebration effectively expanded only after 1946, yielding to the need to honor all the “Russian saints.” Since 2013, it has been tweaked: a feast not only of “Russian” saints but of those who belong to the “Russian world” — the Russkij Mir (including mere ethnic and cultural participation in the Russian tradition).
Added to this are “new saints” outside ecclesiastical control. Vladimir Putin himself is sometimes depicted with a halo of sanctity, with autocratic and anti-Western overtones. The same applies to Stalin.
Kirill, as Sergius of Radonezh, A curious case is Seraphim of Sarov, a monk and hermit, who has become the protector of Russia’s nuclear weapons. This is due to his monastery being confiscated by the Bolsheviks in 1927 and turned into a secret military nuclear research center, an activity that continues to this day.
Moreover, Kirill has visited the most secret and guarded military bases of the Russian army and strongly proclaims that Russia’s survival depends on its atomic armament. One even begins to speak of a “nuclear orthodoxy,” although it seems odd to entrust the humble monk of Sarov with the conviction that Russia’s atomic capability guarantees its civilization and sovereignty.
Even Saint Sergius of Radonezh, founder of the Trinity Lavra and a reference figure for Russian spirituality, today serves a patriotism with messianic and megalomaniac tones. An example is the recent celebration of his commemoration (October 8), in which Patriarch Kirill honors the saint’s deeds for the good he did for the flock of the faithful, for the people, and for the motherland.
In his homily, he says: “When the saint blessed the grand prince to go to Kulikovo — the battle against the Tatars and the Poles on September 8, 1380, won by the Russians led by Dmitry Donskoy (editor’s note) — to fight for the liberty of the motherland, he acted both as a spiritual father and as a political figure. If he had refused, he would have sinned not only as a pastor but also as a statesman.”
He continues by moving directly to the present and to Putin’s power: “Why do I want to speak about this today? Because we, composed of soul and body, belong to two worlds: the world of eternal life and the earthly good in which we live and prepare for eternal life. And, in a sense, people’s very existence in our current circumstances depends on politics; when humanity truly possesses sufficient capacity for complete self-destruction, then politics ceases to be politics in the usual sense of the word and concerns instead the future of every individual and of the entire human race. How many people pray today for our president? Fortunately, more and more, recalling that the Lord has sent us an Orthodox head of state. But how much does the head of state need our support! A spiritual, prayerful support that, reflected in our lives through concrete actions, should guarantee the authority of our president and of our current political leaders. In other words, prayer for the authorities and the military is not something inherited from the past, but something that must be at the center of our spiritual life today. We must pray for those on whose actions the country’s future depends and, in a sense, the future of the Church.”
The symphony and the Katechon. The immediate placing of the saint to justify the current war, with uncritical support from the patriarchate’s leadership, takes the form of fulfilling the “symphony” between throne and altar pursued in the Byzantine tradition. “There is indeed a certain symphony in relations between secular and ecclesiastical authorities,” but — Kirill continues, rising up against those who suspect his servile subordination to the president — “Some of our opponents point the finger and claim that the patriarch acts on the president’s orders. I declare before God: the president has never given orders to the patriarch. And I am sure that, as an Orthodox believer, he will not give them” (homily of April 18, 2023).
This position is consistent with the repeated claim that Russia would constitute the “katechon,” the one who restrains the mystery of lawlessness (2 Thessalonians 2:7 8). A theological justification of the war and of the civilizational clash with the West, hardly compatible with the Gospel and with today’s Christian conscience.
The sensus fidei of the people of God also cultivates very different figures such as Pavel Florensky (1882–1937) and Alexander Men (1935–1990). Brilliant intellectuals in interpreting their time and passionate servants of the faith of the humble, they ended their lives as martyrs. The first was in Stalin’s “purges,” the second was an attack by an unknown assailant. Figures of great importance but politically little usable.
