One more Christian Church at the service of Power. The perilous path of Belgrade’s patriarchate, following Moscow’s inspiration and lighting a potential fire close to Rome.
Five years on from 18 February 2021, when Prvoslav Perić became patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church under the monastic name Porfirije, the positive and open image he projected has faded considerably. (here)
He had introduced himself in these words: “I am Serbian, but above all I am Christian, and this is a universal value, and so I will preach Christ and bear witness. I love my people, but also all other nations, every person, every icon of God.”
On 25 March 2026, on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the NATO bombing campaign, he adopted the “victimhood” narrative of ethnic memory, speaking of the “Golgotha of our crucified people.” The intervention of the Western powers — however much debated — which was inspired by a desire to contain ethnic violence and discourage the expansionism of “Greater Serbia,” becomes in the patriarch’s telling “a unilateral decision by the powers of this world,” one that transformed the country “into a terrible place of extermination with ruins, rubble and terrifying fires.” Not a word of self-criticism regarding the documented violence of Serbian troops in neighboring regions.
The students betrayed
The significant institutional strengthening of the Church — 10 million faithful, of whom 2 million are in the diaspora, 40 dioceses, 3,600 parishes, 2,000 priests — has been accompanied by a progressive closeness to the political power of Aleksandar Vučić, to the point of making the Church the interpreter of the ideology of the “Serbian world” along the lines of the Russkiy Mir (“Russian world”) of the Russian Church.
The most visible moment of this process, in my view, is the patriarch’s visit to Moscow from 21 to 26 April 2025, when he received the highest ecclesiastical honors for his consonance with that Church and enjoyed the distinction of a lengthy dialogue with President Vladimir Putin.
This was the occasion for his explicit denunciation of the widespread Serbian popular protests against the government as a “color revolution,” in full alignment with the orientation of Russian power. The effect was to “dismiss” the youth and popular protest by adopting the Belgrade government’s judgment and its determination to suppress it. In this framing, the students are manipulated by foreign agents and pursue institutional subversion. (here)
The trajectory — which reveals a progressive entrenchment within power — can be traced through several moments: the aforementioned youth protests; the claim to constitute the central pillar of the “Serbian world”; the acceptance of interpreting a national memory devoid of self-criticism, with the consequent positions regarding the war in Ukraine; the relationship with the Patriarch of Constantinople; the denunciation of the European Union’s orientations; and the identification with government interests.
Censure of critics
From the collapse of the canopy at Novi Sad railway station on 1 November 2024 — which claimed fifteen lives and was widely perceived as the visible result of governmental authoritarianism, pervasive corruption, and the impunity of those responsible — a massive protest movement has developed, centered on students and young people but drawing support from many directions: farmers and lawyers, families and professionals alike.
A year and a half after the events, it remains active in hundreds of towns and cities, in countless schools, and in dozens of youth marches that have crossed the country and reached the European Parliament. As one example, 200,000 people demonstrated in Belgrade on 28 June 2025.
In the absence of significant coverage in the mainstream media, I refer readers to the articles published in Courrier des Balkans and Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa.
Regarding the protest movement, the patriarch’s position has become increasingly suspicious. His repeated calls for reconciliation are cast in the same mold as the government’s. The theology faculty, which had become fully involved in the protests, was swiftly brought to heel. The most exposed professors were censured. The theologian Blagoje Pantelić and the priest Vukašin Milićević were removed from their posts, with the priest reduced to the lay state. Earlier censures had struck the priests Nikola Simić and Milan Krstić. The monastic community of Visoki Dečani was also censured.
The most striking case concerns Metropolitan Justin of Žiča, who was suspended from service in his diocese following repeated administrative visitations whose pastoral relevance convinced neither the faithful nor outside observers.
The synod’s press release of 18 February 2026 explicitly denies any political intent, instead citing commercial companies and improper sales involving the bishop and his associates. The other bishop openly in favor of the protest movement against the government is Metropolitan Gregory of Düsseldorf, whose position in the diaspora has marginalized him.
Uncritical narrative
The Serbian Church extends its pastoral responsibility to minority communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Slovenia, as well as in the diaspora (Europe and North America). It occupies a central position in both historical tradition and geographical reach.
From this arises the nebulous ideology of the “Serbian world” as a civilizational project, corresponding to the claims of the “Russian world” (Russkiy Mir), providing indirect justification for the political project of “Greater Serbia” in the same way that the latter covers and justifies Russia’s imperial ambitions.
Its roots are traced back to the medieval past and to the more recent “ideology of Saint Sava,” which assigns to the Serbian people a particular destiny — that of being a chosen people within the economy of salvation. Its most recent concrete manifestation was the Sabor, the assembly (of medieval origin) of the “Serbian worldto,” convened on 8 June 2024, to affirm Serbian identity beyond currently recognized borders, with the implicit claim of annexing the Serbian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the “motherland.”
The patriarch’s fierce opposition to the verdict of condemnation issued by the federal court of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the leader of the “Republika Srpska,” Milorad Dodik, is a direct consequence of this (1 August 2025).
After the collapse of the communist and Titoist narratives, the recovery of the history of Slavic Christianity came easily. The medieval roots were welded, after the devastation of the Nazi occupation, to the ideology of Saint Sava. The “Kosovo Oath” of 28 June 1389 — in which Prince Lazar chooses defeat for the sake of his victory in heaven — becomes the touchstone for a Church whose founder (Saint Sava) calls it to full spiritual and national maturity.
The entire history of the twentieth century is viewed under the sign of the victimized people, and its redemption is bound up with the new hegemonic role recognized for the Church. Commemorating the Kosovo oath or covenant, Patriarch Porfirije expressed himself thus on 28 June 2025: we are heirs of the Kosovo covenant “which for us cannot be and is in no way a myth […] Saint Lazar, before going into battle, took communion with all those who were fighting with him, knowing with certainty that he was not going into battle to win, but […] to save his soul, that is, to save himself, to be saved by the love of Christ. This is the way, brothers and sisters, and it is our covenant […], and this is nothing other than community. This is unity […] The Kosovo testament, like the New Testament, confirms that we are called, and also given, to be one.”
More unison than symphony
The “symphonic” alliance with the power of Aleksandar Vučić — in government since 2014 — has been nourished by the role of values-based hegemony recognized for the Church; by the generosity of subsidies (76 million for the construction of the basilica of Saint Sava, 60,000 hectares of land and forests returned, regular consultations with Church leadership); by consonance with the interests and orientations of Russia (the strong man of the synod being the Russophile Irenaeus of Bačka); and by a proximity-with-distance regarding the European Union.
On the ecclesiastical front, the Serbian Church did not share Constantinople’s decision to grant autocephaly to Ukraine, and has positioned itself as defender of the local Church aligned with Metropolitan Onuphrius. Growing increasingly critical of the West’s cultural directions, Porfirije has still not made the traditional visit to the Ecumenical Patriarch that newly elected patriarchs are expected to pay.
This does not cancel out certain positive elements on the Serbian patriarch’s side. The concordat-based stabilization with Montenegro has reassured the Orthodox-Serbian communities in that country. Similarly, the recognition of autocephaly — in competition with the Phanar — for the Church of North Macedonia has resolved a decades-long schism.
One must also acknowledge the patriarch’s efforts to maintain good relations with the Croatian and Slovenian populations and to avoid closing himself off from ecumenical dialogue with other Christian confessions.
Although he interprets ethnic and nationalist demands, he has never justified recourse to violence.
Beyond the pastoral dimension, his greatest preoccupation is the maintenance of Orthodox ecclesiastical presence in Metohija, in the areas of Kosovo that preserve the historical roots of Serbian Orthodoxy, its oldest monastic settlements, and its most precious artistic heritage.
His position — shared by his Church — is one of territorial claim rather than broad and guaranteed autonomy. He rejects any recognition of Kosovo’s independence and intervenes punctually against every administrative decision that might harm the Serbian minorities still present in the contested territory.
