The Iraq-Iran war 40 years ago should have revealed the vulnerability of the Strait and Tehran’s determination. It’s pointless to shift the blame to NATO.
Years ago, Western nations already faced the start of a crisis related to the transit of hydrocarbons from the Persian Gulf — vital to our economy — through the bottleneck of Hormuz, a narrow, winding strait easily controlled from both sea and land.
On that occasion, the West responded quickly and effectively by sending a naval force to the area — including us Italians — to prevent cargoes meant for us from being caught up in the Iran-Iraq war, which was then at its height.
In theory, what was known as Operation Gulf 1 was a minor naval engagement; however, when we reviewed the results after about a year, we realized it involved Italy — a second-tier participant — in a significant commitment of warships, with the Suez Canal recording the passage of roughly seventy vessels of our Navy over 365 days.
In 1987, there were no major incidents because neither Iran nor Iraq wanted to confront sea forces that were clearly outnumbered, outgunned, and better trained.
Our fairly lengthy stay in the area—from October 1987 to August 1988, when Operation Gulf 1 concluded—helped us understand how extremely difficult it would have been to keep both the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz open to navigation if we had been forced to face a well-armed, determined enemy capable of operating from the sea, air, and both opposing shores.
This realization later led us to launch Operation Gulf 2, when the Desert Storm clashes occurred. A few years later, it raised the possibility of Saddam Hussein reacting within the Persian Gulf — something which, luckily, never materialized.
It would therefore have been wise to learn from past experience and adapt military plans and actions to the constraints imposed by the region’s clearly decisive geographical position.
US President Donald Trump, possibly driven by his rush and confident in the capabilities offered by a national war machine of unique scale and power — further inflated recently to an extraordinary degree by Artificial Intelligence — saw fit to avoid any hesitation in launching his recent action against Iran.
The results—specifically, the crisis that has unfolded in many parts of the world—are obvious for everyone to see, as these regions are suddenly, and possibly for an extended time, deprived of their usual hydrocarbon supplies.
The “American strongman” seems now coming to grips with the disaster, albeit with some delay, and is desperately trying to shift the blame onto reluctant international allies — as has become his habit — apparently hoping to avoid paying the political price for his mistakes in the upcoming US midterm elections, whose outcome is highly uncertain.
In his speeches, the Atlantic Alliance is frequently used as a scapegoat, with no acknowledgment that NATO is simply the military guarantee of an exclusively defensive pact that requires consultation and a clear agreement among all members before taking any action.
The complaints from those who accuse NATO of not immediately following decisions made unilaterally by its strongest — and therefore most important — member sound, unfortunately, like utter absurdity.
The truth clearly lies elsewhere — plainly in the fact that Trump has become entangled in the Iranian thicket without taking the slightest account of the old, fundamental maxim of Master Sunzi, which states that “the good General fights only the battles he is certain to win.”
This happened because, in opposing Tehran, Trump failed to give due consideration to all the factors that could work in favor of his adversaries in a direct confrontation.
First of all, the region’s geography, which offered Tehran not only easy control of the Gulf but also a mountainous terrain that any potential invaders could only fully control at the cost of staggering losses.
Then there is the attachment of Iranians to their country, who — as is emerging day by day — seem to greatly prefer the idea of repelling any foreign enemy, and perhaps Americans in particular, rather than freeing themselves from a confessional regime that until yesterday they had considered oppressive.
Third, the flexibility and preparedness of the country’s politico-military elite, which has proven capable of continuing to function despite the terrible string of targeted killings carried out jointly by the US and Israel.
Furthermore, the fact that long years of preparation for a military conflict — probably considered inevitable — had allowed Tehran to produce and conceal enormous quantities of weapons, even if very difficult to assess.
Not to be overlooked is the attitude of all the neighboring Arab countries: officially aligned with the American position, yet well aware that in the blink of an eye the Iranians could knock them off the scene by targeting their greatest vulnerabilities — such as oil installations, airports, and desalination plants.
To all this is finally added one last element, possibly even more decisive than the others: unlike Americans, Iranians still understand that people die in war and are still willing to die if it proves necessary.
In the war against Iraq, Iran suffered 1.2 million casualties over eight years. It yet did not surrender until a solution was worked out that allowed both sides to claim a partial victory, enabling each to save face.
The American public, by contrast, has evolved over recent decades to a point where it can no longer bear the sight of flag-draped coffins bringing the fallen home. And it is probably that sight, more than anything else, that President Trump fears the most.
So, what now? The question remains open and entirely unanswered — though it wouldn’t be surprising if one day the American President withdrew all his troops from the region, declaring — perhaps surrounded by evangelical pastors, as seems to be his habit in the most critical moments — an American victory that never truly existed.
