A law regulating the presence and activities of the Orthodox Church linked to the Moscow Patriarchate is already in force in Ukraine, under discussion in the Supreme Court in Estonia, and planned and feared in Moldova.
Three years of war with Russia have made such a law acceptable in Ukraine. The theoretical danger of invasion motivates Estonia to consider it, and the clash between pro-Europeans and pro-Russians has prompted Moldovan pro-Russian Bishop Vladimir to fear it and some parliamentarians to consider it.
All of this stems from the unfortunate decision by Patriarch Kirill and the Moscow Synod to uncritically support Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine. The Orthodox leadership has aligned itself completely with the imperial political agenda of the government, providing a spiritual, theological, and cultural justification for a conflict that has already resulted in over a million deaths and extensive damage, primarily in Ukraine (Kathpress, September 30, 2025).
In the context of a “hybrid war,” the suspicion of siding with the enemy has become a certainty, if not evidence, motivating consent to a regulation that demands total autonomy for local churches from the patriarchate and its leadership.
However, the issue of personal rights and civil liberties is absent in Russia. In the three countries in question, legislative regulation of the church raises many suspicions and sensible critical questions. Russian clergy and politicians use it to deny pluralism at home and carry out persecution in conquered territories while calling on democracies abroad to be consistent.
In a context in which Western democracies themselves, starting with the United States, are under strong autocratic pressure, defending the liberal principles of democracy requires greater attention in legislative guidelines. This issue particularly affects the European Union.
National security
On October 1, the UN Human Rights Council issued a statement expressing grave concern about Ukrainian Law 3894, which, due to ecclesiastical and canonical ties with Moscow, “restricts the scope of freedom of worship and religious practice”. Freedom of conscience and religion is non-derogable, and “national security does not constitute grounds for limiting the manifestation of that freedom.”
“By equating religious affiliation with threats to national security, the law establishes a framework of state control that is incompatible with international human rights standards” (Orthodoxie.com, October 20). On September 30, the Sixth Chamber of Appeal in Kiev held the first hearing to enforce the law in relation to the metropolitan diocese of the capital.
Abandoning Moscow
Following the parliamentary approval of the law in August 2024, the Ukrainian State Service for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience launched an investigation into the non-autocephalous (“pro-Russian”) church. The investigation affirmed the church’s continued affiliation with the Russian Patriarchate and called for statutory corrections on July 17, 2025.
According to Lyudmila Filipovitć of the Service: “The state is not prohibiting anything; it is simply asking this church to perform an act of civil courage and publicly declare, ‘We are severing our ties with the Russian Federation.'” Autocephaly was first requested in the aftermath of independence in the 1990s, well before it was granted by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 2019. The appeal was also signed by the current pro-Russian Metropolitan Onufry. The Service’s decision on August 27 to confirm affiliation with Moscow and request the closure of the Church’s activities due to links with a foreign organization belonging to an enemy state was prompted by the negative response to the injunction.
The hierarchs were asked to withdraw from the Moskow patriarchate’s structures, distance themselves from the Russian Church’s statutes, and not recognize the annexation of the occupied territories’ dioceses to Russia or the new bishops appointed to lead them. They were also asked to provide public documents to this effect. These instructions “do not oblige the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (non-autocephalous) to betray Orthodoxy, its liturgical tradition, the language of worship, or the Julian calendar. They do not obligate it to proclaim itself autocephalous. None of that. Rather, it asks the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to abandon the Russian Orthodox Church of Moscow” (V. Elensky of the Service).
In response, Onufry’s church contested the legitimacy of the investigative group. He claimed its autonomy was complete based on the 2022 council-approved statutes. They also denounced the misunderstanding of the difference between canonical and legal ties, as well as the use of Russian documents as evidence.
Complaints and denunciations
The church complains about the unlawful occupation of some of its churches, the expulsion of its monks from monasteries and convents, the imprisonment of priests and bishops, the conscription of some of its priests, and the misunderstanding of the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches (a representative body for churches and cults in the country), which has affirmed the country’s freedom of faith. There have been 1,300 searches.
In the three years of war, there have been 180 criminal proceedings against clergy, including 23 involving bishops. There were 38 convictions in the first two years. In 2025, eleven more convictions occurred. Despite everything, the faithful remain attached to their traditions. Driven out of churches, they gather in homes and form communities that are unrecognized but not illegal. The non-autocephalous Church’s hierarchy is under strong internal pressure. Although it is defended internationally by the Russian Church, it does not enjoy the sympathy of Kirill. Kirill praised the annexation of the four occupied regions and is wary of the local Ukrainian council’s desire for autonomy. The only positive development is abroad. Since the autocephalous church committed to Constantinople not to expand abroad, the faithful among the millions of Ukrainians who have fled find themselves in parishes that refer canonically to Onufry.
The tragedy of deported children
Amid the complex situation described above, the plight of Ukrainian children forcibly removed from their families and sent to Russia comes to light. On September 25, the Italian newspaper Avvenire reported on documents stolen by Ukrainian secret services from Russia that reveal details about the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children from occupied areas. There are reportedly 19,546 children. Only 1,605 have been returned home, thanks in part to the Holy See’s humanitarian diplomacy.
However, according to a September 16 report by Yale University in the US, Russia is estimated to have deported 35,000 children. Through investigations, testimonies, and research, 210 “re-education” institutions have been identified in various parts of Russia and occupied Ukraine, including schools, military bases, hospitals, religious sites, universities, hotels, family support centers, and sanatoriums. The investigation states that “Russia has launched an unprecedented system of reeducation, military training, and dormitories capable of accommodating tens of thousands of Ukrainian children for long periods.”
Le Monde reported on September 16 that “this is the largest child abduction operation since World War II […] Russia has launched a system of brainwashing Ukrainian children, training them as soldiers, and replacing their Ukrainian identity with a Russian one.”
Estonia: the president against parliament
On October 4, President Alar Karis of Estonia rejected a law passed by Parliament on September 17 for the third time. The law aimed to ban religious associations whose leaders and governing bodies refer to “enemy” state powers, thus becoming a threat to the country’s constitutional order and security. The law has consistently received significant support in the parliamentary assembly.
The latest approval was on September 19. According to the bill’s sponsors, the law does not restrict religious freedom. This conclusion is also shared by the Ministry of the Interior and many legal experts. In the face of clear threats from Putin’s Russia, ensuring the security of the state is crucial in a hybrid war, where ethnic-cultural forces can pose a significant threat. The institutional conflict should be resolved by the Supreme Court, which the president has appealed to on the basis of the constitution. The president has spoken out in favor of severing administrative ties between the pro-Russian Church and Moscow.
He justified his dissent as follows: “We have legal means to control and limit the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate, which poisons sovereignty and democracy. The law not only allows, but also requires, control of religious associations. The criminal code defines treason against the state as a crime, which includes activities that influence through information technology. The issue is not the absence of means, but rather, their insufficient use. We must use the existing possibilities more energetically than in the past when necessary.”
In July, he said: “The explanatory report on the law explicitly states that, in addition to regulating administrative relations, the intention is also to regulate the teachings of the Church and religious rites. There are other effective means of countering influence activities, so such extensive interference is unnecessary.” As in Ukraine, two Orthodox churches are active in Estonia: one pro-Russian and one pro-Constantinople.
The pro-Russian church has faced administrative restrictions, including the termination of its very favorable lease on its headquarters. The Pühtitsa women’s monastery has also been pressured to relinquish its stavropegic status, meaning it is directly dependent on the Moscow Patriarchate. After the president rejected the law for the third time, the pro-Russian Church’s Auxiliary Bishop Daniel called for constructive dialogue, which the former interior minister had interrupted. The church complains that it has not been involved in recent discussions and is the subject of constant media prejudice. It also claims that it has not been invited to academic and religious venues dealing with the issue.
The church’s activities are carried out within the framework of Estonian law, and its ultimate governing body, composed of bishops, clergy, and laity, cannot be accused of promoting Russian influence. However, opponents note that Metropolitan Eugene is Russian and lives in Moscow; that local decisions must be transmitted to and verified by the Russian synod; and that the monastery has always opposed calls to sever its ties with Cyril.
Russian-Romanian canonical conflict
Moldova. In a country that has recently confirmed its pro-European stance, the question of the law does not arise. However, there are grounds for perceiving the pro-Russian Church as a “fifth column” of Russian influence on state institutions and nerve centers. As predicted by the Ukrainian bishop of Zaporizhia of the non-autocephalous church, the Ukrainian scenario would be repeated, accusing the Romanian patriarchate of undue and anti-canonical intervention in this case.
His interest in the Bessarabia diocese (which includes part of Moldova) and the Romanian-speaking population constitutes a violation of Moscow’s canonical territory, a “Ukrainian” scenario that could worsen the schism in world Orthodoxy. It would be an illegitimate intrusion into the territory of an autocephalous church, such as the Russian church, to which the local church refers. This is happening with the full consent of the pro-European government, which favors the Romanian Church. According to the bishop, the situation will eventually become explosive, and the traditional pro-Russian church will be persecuted.
An obvious parallel can be seen in the imminent and hoped-for trip of Romanian Patriarch Daniel to Moldova. Just as Bartholomew’s trip to Kyiv started the schism in Ukraine, so would Patriarch Daniel’s trip to Moldova. Furthermore, statements made by Deputy Vasile Soimaru on a popular television program suggest as much. He foreshadowed the possibility of banning the pro-Russian Church’s activities. In response, Metropolitan Vladimir recalled the guarantees provided by the 2007 law on religions and complained about the intimidation of priests and bishops of his church by the state administration. The church strives to maintain good relations with neighboring states, including Russia. Moreover, Russia demands and guarantees total autonomy for the region of Transnistria, where an important Russian military base is located.
Two episodes illustrate this situation. First, a few months before the recent elections, clergy and laity traveled to Moscow on a pilgrimage. According to the media, they returned with money and favors to influence voters. For Bishop Vladimir, however, it was simply a pilgrimage. The second episode, which was much more irritating for the hierarch, involved the transfer of several dozen priests to Romanian obedience. They are accused of doing so for the higher income guaranteed by the Romanian government, but those involved claim their communities pushed them into the move. Diversity also emerged on the day commemorating the country’s independence.
Bishop Vladimir spoke of his church’s progress and praised its defense of “traditional values,” one of Kirill’s key issues. Bishop Pietro (who is pro-Romanian) recalled the promising steps taken by his church and the country’s happy situation, which “aspires to a place of honor in the great European family.”
