Whether peaceful or not, a country’s rise depends on being prepared and seizing opportunities. China has missed this over the past 20 years. Now, it faces the prospect that its rise will not be peaceful and could fail altogether if significant changes are not made. It’s not Xi Jinping’s fault; he alone might have the clout to turn things around.
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At the recent Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2024 in Singapore, there were stark differences in tone and stance between China and its Asian neighbors. It wasn’t just the US confronting China; Asian neighbors backed the US in its firm position against China. The harsh Chinese rhetoric rang hollow, with little support in the hall.
It is impossible to be a leader, hegemon, or empire without open or tacit support from the countries that are supposed to be led. China lacks this support, making its push for its Asian agenda extremely challenging.
It may be the right time to reconsider how China reached this point, given that it came from a very different place some 25 years ago, at the end of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. At that time, all Asian neighbors were suspicious of the US because it was politically supporting economic attacks on Asian markets, which were destabilizing the region.
Right or wrong, Asian countries backed China because China had resisted devaluation pressures, which had checked the tide of competitive devaluation in the region that might have destroyed regional development.
China somehow squandered this support and didn’t build on it, and the tide turned at a crucial moment in the years after 9/11, between 2002 and 2005. During that period, China had an opportunity to aid the US in its efforts to take control of Afghanistan and Iraq, but it didn’t take it. Then things took a different turn.
The mortar of Empires
Empires are built on two things: seizing opportunities and being prepared. This was the case between the US and England: the US replaced England as the main “imperial power” after two world wars, during which the US helped maintain England’s global hegemony almost free of charge. England alone could not have won those wars, but US-backed England and the two systems blended into one another, eventually leading to the US taking over.
A similar pattern occurred among England, the Dutch Republic, and Spain. The Dutch Republic split from the Spanish Empire by fighting against it and helped restore the English crown after the Cromwellian Revolution in the 17th century. Conversely, in the 19th and 20th centuries, the Germans did not play their cards well.
However, perhaps the most glaring examples were the US and England in the 20th century. Americans were willing to make sacrifices with tons of money and many thousands of lives) to support the existing order. With that they eventually inherited and took over the order.
Between 2002 and 2005, China perhaps had a similar opportunity. If it had helped send troops and ammunition to support American success in Afghanistan and Iraq, ties between the two countries might not be as tense now.
At the time, the United States was torn about China. On the one hand, some welcomed China’s initial support for American intervention in Afghanistan; on the other hand, some viewed China as the main strategic adversary, believing the fight against Muslim extremism was a waste of time.
China initially sided with the US by providing materials and information on Afghanistan. However, China didn’t double its commitment when the US encountered difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, it grew aloof and distant, coming to believe that the American system was worse than the Chinese one, that America was doomed, and that China was destined to rise and prevail.
A Power Struggle and the Path Not Taken
That was a major strategic mistake. The US faced troubles and wasted years, enormous amounts of money, and political goodwill, leading to the 2008 financial crisis, but China underestimated the US’s resilience and deep strength. Eventually, it reinforced the camp of those who viewed China as the real enemy.
When the 2008 financial crisis hit, China assisted the US but failed to recognize the difficulties faced by other countries, especially in the region. Ten years earlier, they had believed China was more reliable than the USA. In 2008, they changed their mind. They felt China undercut their exports and the path to their economic recovery by keeping its RMB exchange rate artificially low. Not only did their trade surplus disappear, but their global market shares were also taken over by Chinese companies.
This created a double drift not only between the US and countries in the region that were previously more pro-China. This and its growing assertiveness in the region gradually pushed Asian countries back towards the US.
During the years between 2002 and 2005, China should have 1. urged the US to accept troops and ammunition from China in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it was unwilling to do so. 2. Simultaneously, it should have pushed for a peaceful resolution of North Korean affairs as the six-party talks were unfolding. 3. It should have moved ahead to make the RMB fully convertible and open its domestic market. 4. It should have moved toward some form of political reform. It didn’t do any of that.
Things between the US and China could have turned out differently with these four measures. At the same time, China should have conceded territorial claims to Japan and India and adopted a more relaxed policy toward Taiwan. It should have reinforced Hong Kong’s status as a global financial market, which would have helped pivot the world’s economy and politics toward Asia.
Ten years later, China could have become the center of the world.
Blinding domestic power struggle
China didn’t do that for many reasons. One crucial factor was the leadership succession struggle between Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Jiang was supposed to retire in 2002 and cede full power to Hu. This was also part of the agreement that led to Qiao Shi’s retirement in 1998. Qiao Shi stepped down, accepting new age limits for leaders, with the understanding that Jiang would do the same in 2002.
However, in 2002, Jiang didn’t leave his post; in fact, he created a situation that made it difficult for Hu to rule. The Politburo’s Standing Committee, China’s top cabinet, was expanded to nine members, making it difficult for effective leadership to emerge. Moreover, officially, Jiang kept his position as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, retaining ultimate authority over decision-making and foreign policy.
After 2004, the situation improved slightly but wasn’t fully resolved. Yes, Jiang officially retired as Chairman of the Military Commission, but he still retained some veto power over Politburo decisions.
All in all, until the 2012 party congress, China didn’t have a clear-eyed view of the world because it was engrossed in domestic troubles. Even more so, in those crucial years when China had an opportunity to step up its game and look at the world as it was, it didn’t. It revealed a weak grasp of what was happening globally.
Now, move back to the present, 20 years later. China is stronger, but it missed a major opportunity. The international environment is less favorable than it was then.
What Should China Do?
What should China do, and what could it do in this situation? These complex questions require a realistic assessment rather than wishful thinking. One may wish to swim, but if the water is freezing, you risk getting pneumonia and dying.
China should reassess the situation, reconsider its actions and objective conditions, and re-strategize its future based on objective circumstances.
A historical reference could be Germany after 1870. After it single-handedly defeated France, Germany became the master of continental Europe. Bismarck created a complex web of diplomatic pacts and alliances with Germany at its center. After Bismarck’s death, the emperor unraveled those alliances, failing to see that they had prepared Germany to wait for the right opportunity to expand further, eventually taking the rising power of the United States along.
In China’s case, Xi inherited a strategic mistake and is now trying to fix it. But he is constrained by competing forces that extend beyond his preferences or beliefs, whatever they may be.
On the one hand, he needs to improve economic performance and boost domestic demand, the only force that can set China’s development on the right track in the long term. However, doing so would require approving highly controversial political reforms, such as granting full private property rights.
While Xi holds the power to push these reforms, approving them would undermine and limit the power of the party he has strengthened and honed.
To improve ties with neighbors, he should give up nationalism, thereby allowing the resolution of territorial disputes. However, nationalism is the creed that holds the country together, especially when economic performance falters and “foreign enemies” are to blame.
Beijing needs to talk to the US and its neighbors about these issues, but there is no mutual trust. While in the US, there is no determination to pursue a head-on conflict, there is also no clear commitment to “save China.”
Domestically, almost no one wants Xi to fail, because his fall would sweep away everyone—the poor, the rich, and the cadres. Yet almost no one wants him to succeed either, because he already holds too much power and his success would grant him even more.
Xi’s Gordian Knot and National Visions
Xi must think of something new to navigate these necessary changes, but what? In a way, China has ridden to success almost free of charge, but now it’s at an inflection point, and things could go well or poorly.
Assessing the current situation is crucial. The official rhetoric about Taiwan and the South China Sea reveals the troubles. It seems trapped in late 19th- and early 20th-century perceptions of building and defending a “nation-state.”
This rhetoric is purely 19th-century European[i]. Every 19th-century European nation-state did this: Germans, French, Italians, Spaniards, and even Americans controlled expansion and immigration to preserve their white majority.
Liang Qichao (1873-1929), a key influencer of 20th-century reforms in China, wanted a modern China and looked to what was considered modern at the time. After the 1917 revolution, he and many others believed the West had advanced further and that China should follow the latest Western “model”—the USSR.
Over a century later, China and many of its intellectuals are still grappling with those ghosts, even as the world spins differently. Similarly, Russian President Vladimir Putin seeks to revive the Czarist empire a century after the revolution.
Perhaps they are correct; we might all be heading back to a century ago. In Italy, a self-proclaimed heir of Mussolini is in power. In Spain and France, parties that may harken back to the Falange and Petain are gaining strength; in Germany, the Nazi legacy is resurfacing. Anti-Semitism is being re-legitimized in many demonstrations, conflating reasonable opposition to the Israeli government with unacceptable opposition to the state of Israel and the Jews.
A century ago, the contention among European states was over the occupation of Africa and the spoils of the Turkish Empire in the Middle East. Now, it is about the occupation of the West by migrants from the Middle East and Africa.
Is it wrong for China to think in Liang Qichao’s terms?
Yes, I think it is, but the West is not doing a good job of explaining why it’s so different.
Liang Qichao’s nationalism, evolving from Manchu “suprematism” (because Manchu numbers were small), was similar to 19th-century nationalism. The European concept of nations did not arise from nothing but formed around dominant groups within each country, which sought to “uniformize” lesser groups within their borders, whether real or desired.
Italy is a good example. A small group in the early 19th century became convinced that there were “Italians” and spent the following decades arguing that Italians under non-Savoy control but under Austrian rule needed liberation. They wouldn’t include Corsicans (under French control), Maltese (under English control), or Catalans (under Spanish control), who spoke a dialect closer to standard Italian than the Italian spoken in Trieste.
The Savoy group (the Italian unifiers) themselves spoke French or Occitan, both of which are more distant from standard Italian than Catalan, Corsican, or perhaps even Maltese.
(Incidentally, I don’t want to change the borders of modern Italy; it’s quite the opposite. But we must honestly confront our past and recognize that nations are born of political reality, not cast from an ideal Heaven.)
Indeed, Italian unification wasn’t entirely artificial. Efforts to create an Italian identity can be traced back to Dante and Machiavelli. However, their outlines were very different from those of their 19th-century counterparts. With the Meiji Restoration, the Japanese also Nipponized parts of their country, such as the north of Hokkaido and the south of Okinawa. The Chinese reformers were latecomers to this game. One could trace the idea of a “Han” people to the time of the Mongols, when Dante was active in Florence. But the 20th century was very different.
There is nothing particularly noteworthy here, but two things are particularly worrisome. First, the Chinese are still playing this old game on a different scale and in a different world. Second, the return of nationalism in the West effectively justifies and empowers Chinese nationalism. Together, the two can spin many things out of control.
There’s an alarming red flag—anti-Semitism. It’s back in the West, almost oblivious to past horrors, and for the first time, it has reached China. Some Chinese papers and videos, translated from English, contain anti-Semitic content. Some may come from Russia, but others are from Europe and America. It’s not widespread, but a few years ago, there was only admiration for the Jews.
European history, which has begotten modern nationalism, carries the old seed of anti-Semitism. In history, when societies go after the Jews, other horrors tend to follow. Anti-Semitism is reappearing in many countries. Past terrors may not be so far behind.
[i] I owe this to discussions with Robert Barnett in London and David Yang in Beijing, whom I deeply thank
China’s Rise, Knots and Western New Nationalism - SettimanaNews
China’s Rise, Knots and Western New Nationalism - SettimanaNews