Political fig leaves, Trump’s Chinese agenda, North Korea’s nuclear missiles, and the use of force. There are four distinct yet interconnected sets of problems fueling the ongoing Chinese rhetorical offensive against Japan over Taiwan. The island is, de facto independent but de jure part of one China, as the Republic of China (ROC), thus officially claiming sovereignty over the whole Chinese mainland. It’s a legal and political knot that could well choke Asia and the world.
N.1. Japan’s statement
The Japanese premier, Sanae Takaichi, said on November 7 that a Chinese military intervention in Taiwan or a naval blockade would be an existential threat to Japan. It’s unclear whether the statement was made on the spur of the moment or was calculated. De facto, it dropped a giant existential fig leaf over the issue – China’s belief that without the use of force or its threat, Taiwan will not reunite and will drift towards complete independence. Takaichi, in fact, never opposed the reunification per se, although even a peaceful reunification would be problematic for Japan. She opposed the use of force, which should be normal.
Nobody favors the use of force to solve international or national issues. Taiwan is on the cusp between national and international, so it should be natural to oppose it. But to say so starts a chain of reasoning that shows the king was naked. It implies that China doesn’t believe true, peaceful reunification is possible because it believes its system is unattractive.
Many people in Beijing remember that during the 1989 Tiananmen protests, there were spontaneous demonstrations of solidarity in Taiwan asking for reunification with a democratic China. It never happened again since, and the June 2019 crackdown on protests in Hong Kong is a sour reminder that a reunited Taiwan could face the same fate.
All in all, it tells people in China and around the world that the Communist Party (CPC) ruling the People’s Republic of China (PRC) believes it would be ousted from power without the use or threat of force. China should admit that it will pursue reunification only through peaceful means. But that will be trusting that their system is appealing, but they consciously or unconsciously believe it’s not.
N. 2. The Trump card
Then, because of that, China is doubling down to scare anyone in the region from voicing the same concerns and to corner the US, setting the tone for US President Donald Trump’s visit. Trump should not support Takaichi’s statement, which would encourage many governments in the region to voice similar concerns.
Beijing needs to re-establish the fiction; therefore, the ongoing drama might continue until the Trump visit. It might stop if Trump’s visit goes well. China endured Tiananmen and almost wiped it from collective memory; it may think it can do the same with Takaichi’s statement.
N.3 the North Korean Twist
But there is a twist here. South Korea’s Korea Institute for Defense Analysis recently publicly stated that the world underestimated North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. North Korea has between 127 and 150 nuclear weapons (not 50 to 60 nuclear weapons). By 2030, they will have 200 atomic weapons, reaching 400 nuclear weapons by 2040. This massive buildup is happening under the Chinese watchful eye and most likely with the active support of Russia, paying in technological transfer what Pyongyang gave in troops fighting in Ukraine. North Korea may have sent about 50 thousands soldiers to Ukraine.
That is: possibly the most important fallout of the Ukrainian invasion has been a rise in tensions in Asia. A Russian “victory” in Ukraine could move Moscow’s attention to the east. In WWII, it happened just that. Russia declared war on Japan only after its victory over nazi Germany. It moved its troops east, attacking Japan in Manchuria and Korea, and helping the local communists to take power.
Without Russian intervention, Tokyo would have lost the war anyway, but most likely there would never have been a communist China or Korea. Now Moscow could follow a similar pattern with its Asian allies. It’s already unlikely to drop China, and it’s even less likely to drop North Korea. Therefore, a “Russian victory” over Ukraine would extend Moscow’s clout westward and eastward.
N. 4 Force
The threat of force is the key problem. If the PRC threatens force on Taiwan, it can threaten it on anybody.
The USA doesn’t threaten to use force against its allies, or even “normal” countries, only against ‘bad’ countries. And the process of labelling a country ‘bad’ is usually cumbersome and complicated.
China doesn’t have allies or even ‘normal’ or ‘bad’ countries. There’s only China and non-China, and the PRC can threaten the use of (direct or indirect) force against anybody. The USA does use force; it doesn’t simply threaten it. The PRC has so far not used force, but its posture is often belligerent, thereby intimidating. It sets a different atmosphere in international politics.
Although under President Xi Jinping, there has been a growing effort to win over friends through arguments, the preferred tools of foreign policy have been economic enticements or threats, more or less subtle. This underlines the Chinese lack of confidence in their system. Communists fighting for the USSR were often not Russians (Stalin himself was Georgian) and did believe in the Soviet dream. The Chinese posture shows that the Chinese do not believe in their system.
It’s tough for China without international appeal, with only domestic appeal in defending the nation.
Now the PRC is trying to use legal instruments to bolster its claims about Taiwan. But it’s tough to wade through the legal mud. Post WWII treaties were signed by the ROC, which still exists, and wiping it out of the picture without recovering Taiwan would push Taiwan towards independence.
The Chinese Force is naked. The US could help cover it up, but only to a point. Trump’s withdrawal from international affairs has pushed Asian countries to fend for themselves in the region, and thus, they might be less inclined to listen to America. Besides, if America lends a hand here, what will it want in return? Maybe support in stopping Russia in Ukraine? A drastic cut in its trade surplus? Anything else? And will Asian countries be just muted spectators in the bargain?
China needs something else to get out of this corner, which might become more uncomfortable over time.
